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• 
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF JANE EYRE 
ANITA L. ALLEN* 
I .  I NTRODU CTION 
Charlotte Bronte first  published Jane Eyre in 1847 under the 
androgynous pseudonym Currer Be l l . 1  The commerciall y  suc­
cessful novel made Bronte one of the most famous British writers 
of the Victorian period . 2 Numerous b iographies describe B ronte ' s  
curious career3 and many critical studies interpret her fict ion .  4 
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; J.D. 1984, H arvard Law 
School; Ph .D. 1979. University of Michigan. I would like to thank those who participated 
in faculty workshops at which versions of this Article were presented. Workshops were 
conducted at B oston University Law School, Dartmouth College, Georgetown University 
Law Center. H arvard Law School, Northeastern University Law School. University of 
Michigan Law School, and University of Pennsylvania Law School. For their help in 
preparing this Article, I would also like to thank James Adams, David Attasani, Michele 
Beasley, Robert Fullinwider. Kathleen Genova, Linda H irshman, Lee Llambelis . Frank 
Michelman, M artha M inow, Maria Morales, Judith Resnik, Louis Michael Seidman, 
Giradeau Spann. and Kenneth Winston. 
1 JANE EYRE: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY (Currer Bell ed., Smith, Elder & Co. 1847). 
�See CHARLOTTE BRONTE: JANE EYRE AND ViLLETTE (Miriam Allott ed. ,  1973) [here­
inafter CHARLOTTE BRONTE]; THE BRONTES: THE CRITICAL HERITAGE (Miriam Allott 
ed., 1974) [hereinafter THE BRONTES] (extensive anthologies of 19th- and 20th-century 
critical reviews of Jane Eyre). The Professor, published posthumously in 1857, was 
Charlotte Bronte's first novel. Before she published Jane E.vre, she and her sisters Emily 
and Anne B ronte anonymously published some of their poetry. Poems by Currer, Ellis 
and Acton Bell appeared in 1846. Bronte published her novel Shirley in 1849 and Villette 
in 1853 . 
3 See, e.g., M ARGOT PETERS. UNQUIET SouL: A BIOGRAPHY OF CHARLOTTE BRONTE 
(1986); REBECCA FRASER, THE BRONTES: CHARLOTTE BRONTE AND HER FAMILY (1988); 
HELENE MoGLEN, CHARLOTTE BRONTE: THE SELF CoNCEIVED (1984). For an influential 
early biography, see ELIZABETH GASKELL, THE LIFE OF CHARLOTTE BRONTE (Alan 
Shelston ed. , Viking Penguin 1975) (1857) . 
4 See, e.g., MAGGIE BERG, JANE EYRE: PoRTRAIT OF A LIFE (1987); REBECCA FRASER, 
CHARLOTTE BRONTE (1988); JEANNETTE KING. JANE EYRE (1986); MARGOT PETERS, 
CHARLOTTE BRONTE: STYLE IN THE NovEL ( 1973); Peter Grudin. Jane and the Other 
Mrs. Rochester: Excess and Restraint in Jane Eyre , 10 NovEL 145 (1977) . 
· 
Scholars often point out that Jane Eyre's intense narrative is structurally straightfor­
ward, except for the narrator's occasional direct addresses to her audience and her 
puzzling description of the story being told as both an "autobiography" and a "novel." 
See generally, ANNETTE TROMLY, THE COVER OF THE MASK: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHERS 
IN CHARLOTTE BRONTE'S FICTION 14-19 (1982) (arguing that the novel should be read as 
self-presentation of motives and principles rather than as narration of past experience). 
The plot of Jane Eyre is notable for its inclusion of extraordinary supernatural events 
and unlikely coincidences. These contribute to the novel' s seeming, at times, more 
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The present study of Jane  Eyre highlights previous ly neglected 
legal dimensions of the novel . Jane Eyre depicts a passionate but 
prudent young woman's encounter with l iteral and metaphorical 
law. Happiness comes to Jane only after she overcomes the 
hegemony of passion through knowing conformity to her own 
understanding of the authori tative rules  and principles promul­
gated as the "laws" of God, government,  community, and nature . 5 
Jane  Eyre has played a special role in  the l ives of many of i ts  
female readers . 6 The novel ist  Jamaica Kincaid reports  that she 
"loved Jane Eyre" and read it "over and over" again as  a chi ld  
growing up in  the West Indies . 7 As a chi ld  growing up in  the 
United States ,  I ,  too , read Jane  Eyre repeatedly. I am not certain 
why I cheri shed Bronte ' s  novel . Perhap s I thought its description 
of Jane could also have been a sketch of me : smal l ,  p lai n ,  pre­
cocious ,  passionate , and often sad . 8 Jane presents her l ife as a 
triumph over a society that values submissiveness and physical 
beauty in  women .  Perhaps , therefore ,  Jane ' s  history offered hope 
that intel lect and industry can prevail over misery and injustice . 9  
Final ly,  Bronte ' s  pervasive s lavery metaphors may have struck 
a responsive chord i n  me , an African-American coping with the  
legacy of  social inequality in  the  former s lave state of  Georgia . 
allegorical than literal. The novel is remarkable for its psychological interiority, see 
MOGLEN, supra note 3, at I 06. and for its effective use of natural imagery and metaphors. 
It is also noted for its highly poetic. passionate prose. For example. even at the age of 
10 the diminutive heroine is eloquent: Jane accuses her aunt, "You think I have no 
feelings. and that I can do without one bit of love or kindness; but I cannot live so: and 
you have no pity." CHARLOTTE BRONTE, JANE EYRE 31 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1987) 
( 1847). 
5 Bl/l cf. EuGENE D. GENOVESE, RoL L, JoRDAN,  ROLL: TH E WORLD T H E  SLAVES 
MADE 26 ( 1974) (applying Antonio Gramsci's concept of hegemony, Genovese writes, 
"the law, even narrowly defined as a system of institutionalized jurisprudence", consti­
tutes a "principal vehicle for the hegemony of the ruling class") . 
"See, e.g . . Merle Rubin . Jane Eyre: Heroine of Heroines, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, 
Mar. I I. 1991, at 17 (lane Eyre is a book that "hits you with the shock of recognition 
. . . . Jane Eyre seems familiar . . . [but i]n place of the docile, beautiful scullery maid, 
Bronte gives us a poor, plain. outspoken young woman, with nothing but her native 
intelligence and conscience to guide her. ") . 
7 Leslie Garis, Through West Indian E_ves, N. Y .  TIMES, Oct. 7, 1990, § 6 (Magazine) ,  
a t  42. 
H Cf. Carol Gilligan, Joining the Resistance, 29 MIC H .  Q. REV .  501 (1990) (study of 
white and Hispanic girls in Boston area suggesting that young girls' self-confident will­
ingness to resist authority gives way to insecurity and obedience by age 16). 
y ROLAND B ARTH ES, T H E  PLEASURE OF T H E  TEXT 62-63 (Richard Miller trans., 1975). 
See also Buoy H. BoRUA H, FICTION AND EMOTION: A STUDY IN AESTH ETICS AND T H E  
PHILOSOPHY O F  M I N D  126 (1988) ("Our ability to appreciate fictional characters is of a 
piece with our capacity to appreciate people who are caught up in circumstances of which 
we are also possible victims. ") . 
-
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Before conceiving the idea for the present Article , I was plan­
ning to write a much differe nt essay about Jane Eyre . My original 
aim was to pay homage to a personally meaningful work of art . 
Although aware of a flourishing " law and l iterature movement" 
in legal academe , I d id not set out to write about the legal aspects 
of Jane  Eyre . In fact , I did not regard the novel as having any 
s ignificant legal d imens ions . I thought of writ ing on a topic such 
as Bronte ' s  powerful use of avian imagery. Lacking profess ional 
credentials in l iterature did not stop me from aspiring to publish 
a formal study of some aspect of B ronte ' s  technical artistry un­
related to l aw. Extraord inary fondne ss  for Jane Eyre gave me 
courage to believe that in this instance an avocational break fro m  
writ ing about the law would y ield a paper fit for submission to 
scholarly journals of l iterature . 
Preparing for a serious l iterary study required re-reading Jane 
Eyre . I returned to the novel  excitedly,  expecting the same plea­
sure experienced in childhood . I was not disappointed when it 
came to the lush , poetic language of the novel . However, I was 
very disappointed when it came to the s tory Bronte ' s  language 
related . For me ,  the story was no longer an inspirational romance 
with  a happy ending . A lawyer, I was overwhelmed from the 
start by disturb ing reminders of an iniquitous n ineteenth-century 
legal order. A legal philosopher, I was greeted in the very first 
chapter of the novel by  Jane as an Austinian subject "habitually 
obedient" 10 to the domestic tyranny of her cousin John Reed . 1 1  
A black feminis t ,  I re-read Jane Eyre attuned to the social impl i­
cations of race , class , and gender. 1 2  Through these lenses ,  Jane 
seemed to be a privil eged , bourgeois , white Englishwoman with  
an  admittedly miserable  childhood who complains about wome n ' s  
inequal ity and poverty but does nothing about either, even when 
the economic means for doing so are placed at her disposal . 1 3 
10 JOH N  AUSTIN,  1 LECTURES ON JURISPRU DENCE OR THE PH ILOSOPHY OF POSITIVE 
LAW 221 (Robert Campbell ed. , 5th ed., 1911) (1873) [hereinafter 1 AUSTIN]. 
11 BRONTE. supra note 4 , at 8. 
12 Cf. Deborah E. M cDowell, New Directions for Black Feminist Criticism, in THE 
NEW FEMINIST CRITICISM: ESSAYS ON WOMEN, LITERATURE & THEORY 168 (Elaine 
Showalter ed., 1985): Barbara Smith, Toward a Black Feminist Criticism, in id. at !86. 
' 13 It is not wholly mysterious that Jane would be content once she had found wealth 
and love within a still-unjust world: 
(W]e have a hierarchy in which virtually every individual is in a position of 
dominance with respect to some, while at once being dominated by others. This 
1 76 Harvard Women' s  Law Journal [Vol . 1 5  
Jane Eyre does not resonate with me in  the way that it did 
when I was young. The solution to Jane's profound sense of 
female oppression turns out to be money and a man . She is 
content with a private solution to a public problem.  Today, the 
Cinderella solution to  the problems of personal autonomy skil l ­
ful ly posed by Jane Eyre fal l s  short of my expectations of female 
character and female art . Alice Walker on Miss Celie is more 
in spiring than Bronte on Jane ; John Updike on Rabbit is more 
credible than Bronte on Rochester. 14 
Jane lets me down ; she i s  no longer a heroine meriting emu­
lation .  Jane ' s  lover,  Edward Rochester, make s  me angry. 
Rochester locks the Creole wife he describes as "black" in h i s  
attic and denies her  existence . 15 Furthermore , he responds to  
Jane ' s  needs wi th  deception and selfishness . One cause of my 
awkward emotional responses to th i s  outstanding work of art 
which was , after al l ,  produced in another time and place ,  may be  
that " [w] henever I attempt to ' analyze ' a text which has given 
me pleasure , I encounter my 'individuality ' . . . .  I write myself 
as a subject at present  out of place ,  arriving too soon or too l ate 
. . .  [an] anachronistic subject , adrift . " 1 6 Whatever the cause of 
my new response to Jane Eyre , I now respect the novel but  
admire neither Jane , nor Rochester, nor their story. 
indicates one important motivation in the acceptance of the crucial ideologies 
originally proffered in justification of economic hierarchization . . . .  [V]irtually 
everyone has or feels he or she has something to lose in an economic hierarchy 
such as our own . .. .  Thus pretty much everyone will be inclined in some degree 
to accept the ideology which reenforces [sic] and justifies the hierarchy in which 
he or she is, while dominated, dominant as well. 
PATRICK COLM HOGAN, THE POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION: IDEOLOGY, PROFESSIONAL­
ISM, AN D THE STUDY OF LITERATURE 146 (1990). However, "[p)rimary gain does not 
provide an adequate explanation of the acceptance of ideology by those who are drasti­
cally and unjustly economically limited .  These reflections indicate at least some of the 
reasons why there is a women's liberation movement . . . but no significant, broad-based 
socialist movement . . . .  " !d. at 147. 
14 See ALICE WALKER, THE COLOR P URPLE (1982); JO HN UPDIKE, RABBIT AT REST 
(1990). Cf JANE MILLER, WOMEN WRITING ABOUT MEN, 80, 81, 83, 85, 166, 210, 271, 
284 ( 1986) (analyzing Bronte's treatment of Rochester). 
15 Bertha M ason was not racially black, but a (white) West Indian creole. Jean Rhys 
wrote Wide Sargasso Sea from Bertha's perspective. She painted Bertha initially as a 
poor, "white nigger" living in Jamaica where "black nigger better than white nigger. " 
JEAN RHYS, W I DE SARGASSO SEA 24 (W W. Norton & Co. 1982) (1966) . In Rhys' story 
Bertha inherits wealth as a consequence of her beautiful mother's re-marriage, wealth 
Edward Rochester eventually controls. 
16 BARTHES ,  supra note 9 ,  a t  62-63. 
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The Artic le  that fol lows bears no resemblance to the essay that 
I had original ly planned to write . This Article develops my new 
perspectives on Jane Eyre, the perspectives of an African­
American reader who is also a lawyer, a l egal philosopher, and a 
feminis t .  Accordingly ,  the Article is a close examination of the 
law, the legal philosophy, and the feminism of Jane Eyre . 
First ,  us ing Jane Eyre as an ill ustration ,  this Article endorses 
the contention defended by others that perspectives taken from 
law can il luminate l iterary texts . Second , the Article offers a 
detailed interpretation of Jane  Eyre that suggests answers to some 
of the questions about the text raised by generations of scholar­
ship and criticism .  In  particular, it suggests a way of responding 
to the debates over whether Jane Eyre i s  a novel of female 
l iberation or a novel of female restraint .  My interpretation draws 
on nineteenth-century philosophical conceptions of law, as e lab­
orated chiefly in the writings of Bronte ' s  contemporary, John 
Austin ,  to e lucidate the novel ' s  understanding of the normative 
forces of divine ,  civ il , customary, and natural law. 
Final ly,  this Article raises concerns  about the contemporary 
scholarship that treats  Jane Eyre as a virtual feminist manifesto . 
A deep-running traditional liberal pos itivism is a hal lmark of 
Bronte ' s  nove l .  Viewed in one salie nt aspect ,  Jane Eyre suggests 
no means of escaping the l imitations of gender and poverty to 
women who cannot hope to inherit a fortune or to marry a rich 
man . I t  presents no alternative  to the positive law or legal theory 
that was historical l y  associated with female inequal ity in England . 
Some account is needed of how women, especiall y  feminist s ,  can 
find much of value in a story whose ending offers no resounding , 
that is , no unambiguous and uncontrovers ial, call for feminist 
reforms . 
I suspect that Jane Eyre is a popular work among women 
readers because it is one of the few "class ics" in the E ngli sh  
language that acknowledges typical female concerns from a wom­
an' s  own perspective .  Moreover, whil e  the novel depicts wom­
en ' s  social inequal ity ,  Bronte and her heroine both demonstrate 
women's moral , intel l ectual , and arti stic equality .  I n  these ways ,  
the novel communicates messages of  hope to  many women who 
fee l  misvalued by society.  However, is sues for fem in ist interpre­
tations of the novel remain . The popularity of Jane Eyre among 
women seemingly stems from its abil ity  to console . But ,  as I 
178 Harvard Women ' s  Law Journal [Vo l .  1 5  
retell her story, readers ought not to be as happy for Jane as she 
is ultimately for herself. A consoling novel is not necessarily an 
effective antidote to liberal patriarchy. 
I I .  LAW AND LITERATURE 
A. La w In, As, and Through Literature 
Legal academia has recently rediscovered literature . 17 One im­
portant aspect of the rediscovery is a renewed interest  in literary 
depictions of law. When law-in-literature exponent s make drama,  
short storie s ,  poetry, and novels the focus of their law teaching 
and scholarship ,  18 they commonly select Anglo-American , 
European , or Russian c lassics  that feature legal characters , 
event s ,  institutions ,  metaphors , and themes .  
I n  a second key aspect ,  legal academics '  rediscovery of liter­
ature is a return to fict ion for compelling ideals of morality and 
social jus tice .  Law-through-literature mavens have advised 
courts and the bar to seek in literature the normative diversity 
and inspiration absent in the routine faces of legal practice .  19 For 
17 See. e .g . , RIC HARD A. PoSNER, LAw AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELA­
TION ( 1 988) ; JAMES B. WHITE. THE LEGAL IMAGINATION (U. Chi. Press 1 985) ( 1 973); 
JAMES B .  W HITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING ( 1 984); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, 
THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS ( 1 99 1  ) ; Kenneth S. Abraham, Swtutory Interpre­
tation and Literary Theory: Some Common Concerns of an Unlikely Pair, 32 RuTGERS 
L. REv. 676 (1979); Elliott M. Abramson, La11·, Humanities and the Hinterlands, 30 J. 
LEGAL EDuc. 27 ( 1 979) ;  Robert Weisberg, The Law-Literuture Enterprise ,  I YALE J. L. 
& HUMAN. I ( 1 988); Robin West, Conunwzities, Texts, and La\\': Reflections on the Law 
and Literature Mol'ement. 1 YA LE J. L. & HUMAN. 1 29 ( 1 988); Robin West, Jurisprudence 
as Narrati1·e: An Aesthetic Analysis of Modem Legal Theory, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 145 
( 1 985); James B. White . What Can a La\\'yer Learn From Literature', 1 02 HARV. L. 
REv. 20 1 4  ( 1 989). 
The present law and literature movement is indeed a re-discovery. Jurists and scholars 
of previous generations. including John H. Wigmore, Roscoe Pound, and Benjamin Car­
dozo, explored connections between law and literature. See also JoHN M. GEST, THE 
LA WYER IN LITERATURE (19 1 3 ). 
1� See, e .g . ,  POSNER, supra note 17 (including discussion of Albert Camus' The 
Stranger. James Gould Cozzens' The Just and the Unjust, Franz Kafka's In the Penal 
Colony, William Shakespeare's Merchant of Venice. and Mark Twain's Pudd'n-head 
Wilson) . 
19 See, e.g .. Linda R. Hirshman. Bronte, Bloom, and Bork: An Essay on the Moral 
Education of Judges, 1 37 U. PA. L. REV. 1 77 ( ! 988). 
1 992] The Jurisprudence of Jane  Eyre 179 
more than a decade , lawyers , j udge s ,  and magistrates have fol ­
lowed the  advice of  the legal humani st s ,  combatting "burn-out" 
through participation in  publ ic ly and privately funded seminars 
devoted to discussion of l iterary tex t s . 20 
A t hird aspect of the rediscovery of l iterature is the perspective 
that l egal materials ,  including appellate opinions and scho larsh ip , 
are a form of creative l i terature . The law-as- l iterature movement 
has spawned the c losest inquiries into the similarities and differ­
ences among nominal ly legal and l i terary uses of l anguage . 2 1  
While controversies remain about the ultimate value of turning 
to theories of l i terary studies to explain the nature of l egal dis­
course and interpretation, 22 l i terary styles and genres have be­
come increasingly fami l iar in the law journals . 23 
Whether the l e ssons of interdiscipl inary confrontation are 
many or few i s  a topic of on-going exchanges .  However, the 
rapprochement of law and l i terature24 amply demonstrates t hat 
the field  of law can learn from the field of l i terature. 25 More ful ly ,  
it  demonstrates that l egal educators , theorists , and practitioners 
can learn from creative writers , works of l iterature , and l iterary 
theori st s .  
'0 See Martha M inow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language, 
and Family Violence, 43 VAND. L. REv . 1 665, 1 689 ( 1 990) (describing literature seminars 
for judges at Brandeis University). 
" See, e .g . ,  Thomas Grey, Steel Against Intimation: The Motive for Metaphor of 
Wallace Stevens, Esq. ,  2 YALE J . L. & HUMAN. 2 3 1  ( 1 990) (considering whether lawyers' 
poems belong in legal canon); Margaret Radin, "After The Final No, There Comes a 
Yes": A Law Teacher's Report, 2 YALE J.L. & H UMAN. 253 ( 1 990) (same). See also 
Robin West, A djudication is Not Interpretation: Some Reservations About the Law-As­
Literature Movement, 54 TEN N .  L. REv. 203 ( 1987); Robin West, Law, Literature and 
the Celebration of Authority, 83 Nw. U. L. REv . 977 ( 1 989) . 
22 See generally SANFORD LEVINSON & STEVEN M AILLOUX, INTERPRETING LAW A N D  
LITERATURE: A HERMENEUTIC REA DER ( 1 988). 
' 3  See, e . g . ,  Derrick Bell, Racism: A Prophecy for the Year 2000, 42 R UTGERS L. REV. 
93 ( 1 989). 
24 Particular studies of law and literature may incorporate perspectives on law-in­
literature, law-through-literature, and law-as-literature. See, e.g . , PosNER, supra note 1 7. 
As Posner notes, there is also a law of literature that includes the law of copyright. !d. 
at 3 1 9-52. 
25 See, e.g . ,  John H. Wigmore, Introduction to GEST, supra note 1 7, at viii-ix (sug­
gesting that every lawyer must be familiar with novels and other fine literature as "one 
bound to know what features of his professional life have been taken up into general 
thought"; literature reflects "the history of law " and the "operation of the old rules now 
gone "; the "living side of the rules of law is often to be found in fiction alone "; and, 
finally, lawyers must know human nature and "literature . . .  is a catalogue of life's 
characters. "). 
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B .  Jurisprudence in the Novel 
Assuming that law can learn from l iterature , is the reverse also 
true? Can l i terature learn from law? I believe it can . The general 
as sertion that l i terature can learn from law is neither original nor 
controversial . 26 I t  has long been recognized , for example ,  that 
l iterary fiction can take i ts  subject matter from the l ife of the l aw 
by bui ld ing stories  out of actual legal events and personal it ies .  
The law reports are fil led with human drama. The facts of actual 
cases are potential sources of gripping fiction .  
The field of l i terature can learn from the field of law in another 
respect . Legal experts  can i l luminate the legal assumptions and 
depictions of legal doctrine found in  works of l i terary fiction .  
S ince legal accuracy per se i s  seldom critical to  the aesthetic 
success of a work of art , scholars who i l luminate the legal context 
in which a work is produced may make more significant contri­
butions t han those who take technical issue with the truth value 
of legal proposit ions a work asserts  or implies . Yet ,  some fiction 
has reali s t  pretensions and is  valued for its real i sm .  Astute l aw­
yers with relevant  experience are particularly well-suited to as­
sess the real i sm of depictions of legal practice . 
Lawyers can go beyond describing the positive legal order of 
an author' s era or gauging the veris imil i tude of legal representa­
tions .  27 Lawyers can contribute to the study of l iterature by 
i l luminating the legal phi losophy, that i s ,  the jurisprudence , in  
works of l iterary fict ion . 2il The jurisprudential theory contained 
in l iterature has not received the attention it deserves .  Accord­
ingly ,  the central purpose of th is  Artic le is to demonstrate that 
studies of jurisprudence (an aspect of " law") have something of 
value to offer studies of the novel (an aspect of " l iterature"). My 
example i s  Charlotte Bronte's Jane Eyre . Establ i shing t hat jur-
26 See generally infra notes 59-62 and accompanying tex t .  
2 7  Richard Posner has  assessed a number of  such contributions a t  length.  PoSNER, supra 
note 1 7, at 7 1 -1 3 1 .  
28 I use "jurisprudence" here, along with "legal phi losophy," to denote perspectives on, 
or analysis  of, the conceptual and normative foundations of the  law. Lawyers and legal 
academics currently use "jurisprudence" in at least three other senses.  The term denotes 
substantive fields of law v iewed as a whole, as in "const i tu tional juri sprudence·· or 
"criminal jurisprudence .
. . The term also denotes the process of judicial adjud ication . 
"Juri sprudence" denotes . final ly . d isparate interd iscipl inary subjects relating to the foun­
dations of law such as legal h istory. legal anthropology, legal sociology, and legal rh etoric . 
I 
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isprudential  i nsights are of value to the study or appreciation of 
novels  wil l  require more than one good i l lustration .  29 I am never­
theless optimistic that future jurisprudential studies of other nov­
e ls  wil l  corroborate my claim .  At a minimum,  the present effort 
wil l  augment the discussion of interdiscipl inary teaching and 
learning by providing evidence of the manner in which lawyers 
and judges who read juri sprudence may come to read novel s .  
A rough conception of the law in l iterary fiction wil l  help clarify 
what I mean by the jurisprudence in  l iterary fiction . The formal­
ist ' s  rules and the Holmesian "bad man ' s" sanctions are the most 
apparent law appearing in l i terature . 30 But the law in l iterature 
encompasses al l of a work ' s  l iteral and metaphori cal represen­
tations of encounters with : norms,  in the form of rule s ,  com­
mands ,  principles , maxims , and rational precepts imposed by 
reason ,  power, and authority ; sanctions, both positive (e . g . , re­
wards)  and negative (e .g. ,  punishments ) ; and actors, authorit ies , 
officials, and profess ionals who legis late , expound, prosecute , 
defend , judge , and sanction under the banner of a community ' s  
governing norms .  Against this  tripartite understanding of the law 
in l i terary fiction ,  the jurisprudence in  l iterature can be explained 
as a work' s  most general descriptive , prescriptive , and analytic 
theories about legal norm s ,  sanction s ,  and actors . The jurispru­
dence of a work of fiction important ly inc ludes its answers to 
perennial questions about the nature of law, legal obligation , l egal 
reasoning, l egal judgment ,  l egal order, and , in its broadest sense s ,  
justice . 
What many academic lawyers teach under the rubric of j uris­
prudence is  therefore a part of what l iterary studies can l earn 
from legal studies .  Juri sprudence can have a powerful role in a 
work of l i terary fiction which contains l itt le expl icit  legal drama. 
Scholars who e xtract and e laborate the jurisprudential d imen-
2" June Eyre is  a superb i l lustration of  the  broad points l wish  to make about l aw and 
l i terature. However, I did not canvass world literature and select i t  as the focus of this  
Article solely for that reason.  I do not even c laim t hat Jane Eyre i s .  in  every significant 
respect ,  a typical or "standard "  novel. Cf. Kendall Walton, Categories of Art. 78 PHIL. 
REv. 334. 337-42 ( 1 970) ( describing works of art as having "standard. variable  and contra­
standard properties"). l have selected Jane Eyre because of i ts  special appeal to female 
readers and for i ts  pedagogical  potential . 
30 Oliver W. Holmes .  The Path of the Lall'. 1 0  HARV.  L. REv. 457, 457-62 (1897) 
(arguing that the "bad man" cares only about legal prophecies ,  not about eth ical axioms 
or deductions ) .  
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s ions of l i terature have something important to add to scholarly 
efforts to understand works of fiction, their authors , and their 
authors ' intel lectual mi l ieu s .  Lawyers are by no means uniquely 
qualified to elaborate the j urisprudence in literature ; however, 
interested interdiscipl inary lawyers may have a heightened sense 
of the importance of doing so . 
C. Reading for the Jurisprudence 
Literary analysis and interpretation3 1 of the novel  profitably  
can include "reading for the  j urisprudence .  "32 Jane Eyre i s  an 
excel lent vehicle for the argument that bringing legal phi losophy 
to bear on l i terature has a pay-off for l i terary analysis  and inter­
pretation. A jurisprudential reading of Jane  Eyre can enhance 
aesthetic appreciation of the novel as a work of art . A jurispru­
dential reading can also enrich  appreciation of the novel  as an 
artifact reflecting the phi losophical predilections of i ts  age . 
Barred b y  her gender from the legal and scholarly professions , 
Bronte nonetheless e xpressed a subtle understanding of law in 
her fiction. I draw on the analytical jurisprudence of John Aus-
31 l leave unexamined t h e  q uestion of whether t h e  value o f  jurisprudential i nsights t o  
the study of t h e  novel w i l l  s ignificantly vary depend ing upon one' s l iterary theory­
whether one i s  a new crit ic , hermeneuticist,  s tructural ist ,  post-structural ist ,  etc .  See 
generally TERRY EAGLETO N ,  LITERARY THEORY:  AN INTRODUCTION ( 1 983) ( explicat ing 
postmodern l i terary theories ) ;  LITERARY THEORY TODAY ( Peter Coll ier & H elga Geyer­
Ryan eds . ,  1990) (analyzing v arious postmodern l i terary theories ) .  See also KING,  supra 
note 4, at 76-92 ( suggest ing how structural i s t ,  post-structural ist ,  and feminist  crit ics might 
approach Jane Eyre). 
32 "Reading for the j urispru d ence" can be loosely analogized to "reading for the plot ." 
See generally PETER B ROOKS, READING FOR THE PLOT: DESIGN AND INTENTION IN 
NARRATIVE ( 1 985 ) .  B rooks examines the dynamics of traditional modern narratives to 
reveal what they say about the  temporal organization of reali ty .  I examin e  the narrative 
movement of Jane E_vre to reveal what i t  says about the normative, especial ly legal, 
organization of real ity.  
I should note, however, that I am not concerned with what Brooks termed, after S usan 
Sontag, the "erotics of art"-the supposed " internal energies and tensions ,  compulsions,  
res istances, and desires" of a text  v iewed apart from its author, readers, and characters. 
!d. at x iv-v . Cf. David Cole, Agon at Agora: Creative Misreadings in the First Amend­
ment Tradition 95 YAL E  L.J .  857, 863 ( 1 985) (considering Freudian perspective on law 
and l i terature) . I am interested i n  the i nterplay between the personal impact ,  the formal 
aesthetics, and the polit ics of art . See generally THE N E W  FEMINI ST CRITICISM: EssAYS 
ON WOM E N ,  LITERATURE & THEORY , supra note 12 . 
• 
1 992] The Juri sprudence of Jane Eyre 1 83 
t in , 3 3  Bronte's countryman and contemporary, to frame her fe­
cund tale as an instantiation of nineteenth-century legal thought .  
Jane Eyre i s ,  I suggest, the story of Jane ' s  eyre.34 My comparison 
of the work of the reclus ive novel is t  with the work of a reclus ive 
lawyer reveals i nit ial ly surprising congruence that i s  ult imately 
not very surprising at all . 
A juri sprudential readi ng of Jane Eyre does more than identify 
and explain the legal elements of the novel . My j urisprudential 
reading helps to locate the unity i n  the novel ' s  plot and to explain 
why Jane Eyre i s  a masterpiece of fiction .  I t  helps to explain 
why, as Margot Peters argued on related grounds , 35 Jane Eyre is  
not interpreted plaus ib ly as simply a wi ld ,  unreal i st ic Gothic 
romance . The jurisprudential reading of Jane Eyre also gives 
coherence to the character of i ts  heroine . 36 For example , i t  helps 
33 John  Aust in ( 1 790-1 859) first publ ished h i s  l egal phi losophy as  The Province of 
Jurisprudence Determined i n  E ngland in  1 832. Aust in 's work i s  now col lected i n  I 
AUSTIN, supra note 1 0 ,  and in JOHN AUSTI N, 2 LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE OR THE 
PHILOSHOPHY OF POSITIVE LAW (Robert Campbell ed . ,  5th ed . ,  1 9 1 1 )  ( 1 87 3 )  (hereinafter 
2 AUSTIN).  
3 4  Jane Eyre, who travelled from one domestic venue to another passing judgment on 
herself and others,  was a kind of "justice i n  eyre. " B eginning in  the Middle Ages and 
continuing through about 1 340, E ngli sh  kings commissioned "the general eyre" consisting 
of i t inerant just ices i n  eyre, c ircui t  judges who travell ed about from d istrict to district 
hearing cases . R . J .  WALKER,  THE E NGLISH LEGAL S YSTEM 1 2- 1 3  (5th ed . 1 980) .  The 
much feared and unpopular justices in  eyre possessed extensive royal powers; and , 
according to some authori t ies ,  their dut ies included both "the administration of justice 
. . .  [and the) getting of money into the king ' s  exchequer through the infliction of fi nes 
and amercements . "  Harold D .  Hazeltine. Introduction to WILLIAM C .  BoLLAND , THE 
GENERAL EYRE x i  ( 1 922). While the just ices in eyre "meted the exchequer a handsome 
return . . .  , [w]hen we turn . . .  to the equ i table proced ure by  bi l l  in eyre, royal justice 
displayed a milder temper:  h ere at least, so it  would s eem, justice predominated , over­
riding the claims of revenue. " !d. at x i i .  
Bronte may not  have known of  the  general eyre. I t  i s  l ikely that a v i s i t  w i th  her friend 
E llen Nussey to the  v i l lage of Hathersage led B ronte to select "Eyre" as h er heroine's 
surname. Rebecca Fraser reports that B ronte vis ited the church  and church yard at 
Hathersage, which are fi l led with monuments to a real-l ife Eyre fami ly, and that she 
"certain ly  v is i ted members of this  ancient squirearchical fami ly  st i l l  l iving near Bather­
sage. " FRASE R, supra note 3 ,  at 229 . North Lees, the manor house and seat of the E yre 
fami ly, i s  a great house B ronte vis ited which fits her description of Thornfiel d .  !d. 
35 See PETERS, supra note 4, at 1 3 1 ,  1 46-48 . 
36 Cf. SANDRA M .  GIL B E RT & S USAN GUBAR,  THE MADWOMAN I N  THE ATTIC: THE 
WOMAN WRITER AND THE N I NETEENTH-CE NTURY LITE RARY IMAGINATION ( 1 979) (pre­
senting one of the most influent ial in terpretations of lane Eyre). My reading is not intended 
to supplant Gi lbert ' s  and Gubar ' s .  Their contention, id. at 3 1 7 . that Jane Eyre masks the 
author ' s  despair about confinement in  female rol es, i s  very plausible, given the tenor of 
the letters B ronte wrote to friend s  prior to her marriage. But  I do not ful ly  embrace t heir 
interpretation of B ertha Mason as Jane' s double and Jane Eyre as a parody of the 
"nightmare confessional mode of the gothic genre and the moral didacticism of B un yan 's  
Pilgrim's Progress." !d. at 3 1 4  .
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to make sense of why Jane ,  a lonely,  prudent , realistic woman , 
would at first refuse to live with the one man on earth who truly  
loved her  bu t  would later al low herself to be guided by super­
natural voices to return to her presumably  stil l-married lover. 37 
The jurisprudential reading I give helps to shed light on the 
contradictions in Jane Eyre criticism and scholarship . My reading 
helps to account for why the critics various ly have viewed reli­
gion ,38 moral convention ,39 and nature40 each as the dominant 
theme or normative force in the nove l . It i l luminates why critics 
divide over whether Jane Eyre is a radical novel of female 
liberation4 1 or a novel of female restraint . 42 My reading also ad­
dresses the tension between the feminism in Jane Eyre and Jane's 
finding complete happiness in a conventional marriage and moth­
erhood ,  a lbeit a marriage to a deceitful man with  a lewd past .  I t  
shows that t h e  feminism i n  Jane Eyre i s  qualified . 
D.  Feminism and Positivism 
The distinct ly legal aspects of Jane Eyre have largely  gone 
unnoticed by lawyers interested in literature . 43 James Lorimer, a 
jurist  and p hilosopher who once held the chair of The Law of 
Nature and Nations at Edinburgh , reviewed Jane Eyre in 1849 
37 But cf. Ruth Bernard Yeazel! ,  More Tme Than Real: Jane Eyre's "Mysterious Sum­
mons", in N I N ETEENTH-CENT U RY fiCTION 1 27 ,  1 29 ( 1 974 ) .  Yeazell's assertion that Jane's 
hearing of Rochester ' s  cry i s  an  outward sign of an i nward readiness to accept love cannot 
be reconciled with my understanding of the text.  Jane never lacked a readiness to accept 
love, as her relationship wi th  those who were kind to her-Bessie. H el en Burns ,  M iss 
Temple, the Rivers sisters-proves. Jane was ready to accept Rochester' s love, too , but  
she was unwil l ing to accept the  consequences of being his mistress .  
3 8  See, e .g . , Kath leen Til loston, Jane Eyre and the Triumph over Angria , in C HARLOTTE 
B RONTE, supra note 2 .  
39 See, e .g., K I N G, supra note 4 ,  a t  63 ("most critics would agree that moral i ty i s  a 
principle theme i n  Jane Eyre" ) .  
40 See, e .g  . . ENI D  DuTHI E ,  C HARLOTTE B RONTE A N D  N ATURE (1986).  
41 See John H agan, Enemies of Freedom in "Jane Eyre", in CRITICISM 35 1 ,  353  ( 1 971 ) 
( arguing that Jane Eyre is a story of l iberation through love and through l iv ing in accord 
with the moral law of God,  accompl ished by a series of escapes ) .  
·�See Grud i n ,  supra note  4, a t  1 45 ("Jane E.vre i s  a didactic novel t hat subordinates 
the values of passion to those of restrain t" ) .  
4 3  IRVING B ROWNE,  LAW A N D  LAWYERS I N  LI TERATURE ( 1 883)  d id  no t  l i s t  Jane Eyre , 
nor have other bibliograph ies i n  the field .  See, e .g . , John H .  Wigmore, A List of One 
Hundred Legal Novels , 1 7  U. ILL. L .  REV. 26 ( 1 923 ) .  Cf. Richard F. Wolfson A esthetics 
in and About Law, 33 KY . L . J .  33 ( 1 944-45)  (assess ing Wigmore' s select ions) .  
--
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for the North British Review .  Even he brought no special insight 
to the task .  His review defending Jane  Eyre against charges  of 
vulgarity was memorable  not for any attempt to expl icate the 
jurisprudence of the nove l ,  but for its insistence that "Currer 
Be l l, "  Charlotte B ronte ' s  pen name, was a man or, if a woman , 
"pretty nearly unsexed .  "44 
As previous ly  observed ,  Jane Eyre has p layed a special role  in 
the lives of many of its female readers .45 Women educators may 
have been the first to commend Jane Eyre to the law and l iterature 
movement. Carolyn Heilbrun and Judith Resnik have identified 
Jane Eyre as a novel worthy of attention . 46 Linda Hirshman has 
gone so far as to exalt Jane Eyre as "real l y  the mother of us 
all .  "47 Focussing on works ,  including Jane Eyre , that present 
dilemmas of female autonomy, Hirshman argues  that constitu­
tional interpretation ought to draw on the moral insights of great 
literature . 48 
I concur t hat Jane Eyre (the book) deserves serious attention 
from l egal educators and scholars . But  I hesitate to enshrine Jane 
Eyre (the character) as a feminist icon .  The thrus t  of my Article  
i s  thus  quite different from the  direction of  Hirshman ' s  earlier 
articl e .  My concern rests  primarily with explicating the j urispru­
dence in literary fiction , rather than with improving law and legal 
practice through literature . Moreover, by displaying similarities 
between the j urisprudence of Jane Eyre and the j urisprudence of 
the classicall y  positivist John Austin , I cast doubt on Hirshman ' s  
prescription o f  Jane  Eyre a s  an antidote t o  Robert Bork ' s  con­
stitutional positivism .  49 
As I read the novel , Jane Eyre reflect s ,  as much or more than 
it condemns ,  key aspects of the tradition of E nglish legal positiv­
ism .  Jane Eyre assumes positivism ' s  traditional analytical dis­
tinction between positive civil l aw and other normative real m s ,  
including positive morality and divine law. The narrative appears 
44 Lorimer 's  anonymous review i s  included in  THE B RONTES, supra note 2 ,  at 1 1 3- 1 6 . 
45 See, e .g . ,  R ubin ,  supra note 6. 
46 Carolyn Hei lbrun & J ud i th Resnik ,  Convergences: Law, Literature, and Feminism, 
99 YALE L . J .  19 13 , 1935 ( 1990). 
47 H irshman , supra note 1 9 ,  at 209 (c i t ing V. THOMSON.  THE MoTHER OF Us ALL 
( 1 947 ) ) .  
48 !d. 
49 But cf. Abramson. supra note 17 ( arguing t hat law itself can be a humani ty )  . 
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to share posit ivism ' s  faith that adherence to establ ished rule s ,  
princip le s ,  and authorities i s  conducive to happines s .  
The novel also adopts a quite significant ,  though less  fami l iar, 
feature of English pos it ivi sm :  the virtual unity of actual and ideal 
law. Posit ivist legal t heories typical ly  maintain that the actual 
positive law of modern civi l izations is highly congruent with ideal 
law. 50 That i s ,  the conduct that posit ive law requires i s ,  to a 
significant extent ,  the conduct t hat morality requires as wel l .  51 
A spirit of protest  pointing toward reform is evident in  Jane 
Eyre Y· But  that spiri t  i s  not eas i ly  equated with a platform agains t  
legal or constitutional positiv ism .  H irshman and other contem­
porary feminists make l iberal and progressive uses of Jane Eyre , 
focussing on  passages53 that convey the pain that accompanies 
legally  enforced social  inferiority .  54  After reading Jane Eyre , one 
might wel l  understand better why legal policies and t heories that 
impair female equality are inhumane . But  any improved ability 
to understand women ' s  legal interests after reading I ane Eyre 
must occur despite Jane E yre . Jane , l i ke Cinderel la ,  finds hap­
piness without upsetting the major institutions and practices that 
l imit women to domestic rol e s .  Jane i s  completely satisfied with 
individual , private so lutions to what feminism characterizes as 
'" See infra notes 95- 1 02 and accompanying tex t .  
51 Thomas Hobbes subscribed to a stronger version of  the  congruence thesis than John 
Aust in or H.  L A .  Hart : Aust in  and H art subscribed to an arguably stronger version than 
reform-minded Jeremy Bentham. See infra notes 95- 1 02 and accompanying text. 
'� A spi ri t  of protest flourished in England at the t ime Bronte wrote Jane Eyre . See 
FRASER, supra note 3 .  at 1 47 (amidst much debate i n  the 1 840s . activists demanded 
political reform i n  recogni t ion of women· s rational natures and advocated higher education 
for women ) .  Jane's determination to be rati onal and i ntel l igent makes credible the repu­
tation of  the book as a "fem i nis t  trac t . "  See GILBERT & GUBAR,  supra note 36 ,  at 338. 
53 See, e .g  . . B RONTE, supra note 4 ,  at 1 04-05. 
54 However. Jane Eyre d oes not d ictate specific outcomes in the way Hirshman sug­
gests .  S peaking about abort ion law, H irshman writes : 
When deciding if society has a right to i mpose i ts  judgment in a matter so critical 
to female autonomy as the  i m posit ion of an unwanted pregnancy, Jane Eyre can 
tel l  u s ,  as no pol it ical p h i losophy can, that we are proposing to do an act with 
great moral consequences to another human being.  Of at least equal importance, 
Jane Eyre tells us that the  h istory of our societ y ' s  treatment of women i s  such that 
the decision to take that autonomy away must be approached with the greatest 
caution . lest we accept th is  deprivation s imply because it reproduces a fami l iar 
status .  
Hirshman. supra note 47.  at 2 1 6 .  Jane Eyre may "tell" some readers some of these th ings 
some of the t ime. but I would dispute  that the novel so unambiguous ly  conveys  the 
necessity of a permiss ive abortion stance. 
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social , publ ic problems . Readers who identify with Jane or who 
find her narrative persuasive may also settle for private solutions .  
Professor H irshman ' s  proposed use of Jane Eyre overlooks a 
point about  the novel that Roland Barthes makes about  texts i n  
general : "There are those who want a text . . .  w ithout a shadow, 
without the 'domi nant ideology ' ;  but this i s  to want a . . .  sterile 
text . . . .  The text needs i ts  shadow: this shadow is a bit of 
ideology, . . .  a bit of subj ect : ghosts ,  pockets , traces ,  necessary 
clouds :  subversion must produce its own chiaroscuro [s ic] . "55 My 
jurisprudential reading of  Jane Eyre i l luminates the  observation 
of Brook Thomas that l i terature i s  not "an inherent ly  subversive 
cultural i nstitution" and,  in fact ,  "can serve the dominant ideol­
ogy as well as chall enge it .  "56 The "dominant ideology" of 
Bronte ' s  t ime lurks in the shadows of her text . 1 ane Eyre , l ike 
many texts , does not sole ly or main ly "generate narratives" that 
deeply contest the legal ideology of its periodY The novel pre­
sents i tse lf as a story of female i ndependence achieved through 
the acquisit ion of conventional goods :  money and a man . With 
the juri sprudence of Jane Eyre ful ly  in view, feminists may come 
to conclude that this bri l l iant  favorite of women is a l itt le dan­
gerous for women and ,  therefore , for us all .  
I I I .  NOVEL LAW: THE L EGAL ELEMENTS O F  JANE 
EYRE 
A .  Traditional Legal Elements :  Action,  Language, and 
Characters 
A fictional autobiography,  Jane Eyre concentrates on the mid­
dle decades in the l ife of an intense , passionate young governes s .  
The bare s tory l ine  o f  Jane  Eyre conceals its jurisprude ntial 
riches .  Jane Eyre can be read as a simple romantic tal e ,  a kind 
of adul t  Cindere l la  story ,  58 narrated chronological ly i n  the first 
5 5  B ARTHES ,  supra note 9 ,  at 32. 
'6 B ROOK THOMAS.  C ROSS-EXAM INATIONS OF LAW & LITERATURE:  COOPER, HAW­
THORNE ,  STOWE ,  AND M ELVILLE 6 ( ! 987 ) .  
57 See generally id. a t  6 .  
5 8  See  GILB ERT & GuBAR ,  supra n o t e  36,  at 35 1 ,  363 . 
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person singular by its heroine . Jane Eyre takes the reader on a 
journey through a sequence of events situated in  six residential 
venues indicative of the c loistered female experience about which 
Jane complains : Gateshead Hal l ,  the home of orphan Jane ' s  
heart less rich aunt and cousins ; Lowood Institution ,  the charit­
able  boarding school at which Jane is first a pupi l  and then a 
teacher;  Thornfield H al l ,  Rochester' s  house ,  where Jane goes to 
work as governes s ;  the Rivers ' Moor House ,  Jane ' s  sanctuary 
after her flight from adultery at Thornfield ; Morton Cottage , 
Jane's private quarters adjoining her rude vi l lage schoolhous e ;  
and , finally ,  the manor house at Ferndean , w here Jane and 
Rochester reunite . The narrative takes Jane from house to house , 
none ful l y  home unti l  the las t .  
Jane Eyre is not e s sentiall y  a story of  legal process  or institu­
tions . For example , it is not mainl y  about a trial in a courtroom59 
or prison l ife . 60 Jan e  Eyre is no Bleak House . 6 1  B ronte's novel 
does not exude the world ly grasp of legal institutions evident in 
the novel s  of Anthony Tro llope62 and Sir Walter Scott .  63 
Nevertheles s ,  some of the crucial plot e lements in Jane Eyre 
involve major legal events , namely ,  marriage and inheritance . 
Both the discovery of a l egal impediment to Jane and Rochester ' s 
union and Jane's d iscovery t hat she i s  a missing heiress  are 
pivotal plot developments . These are key to Jane ' s  achieving 
personal and material autonomy. Bertha ' s  attempts on the lives 
of Rochester and her brother, Mr. Mason ,  are prima facie torts 
and crimes ,  legal events  of another dimension . Once the narrator 
reveals the identity of the perpetrator, a woman b lameless  by 
reason of insanity ,  what appear to be heinous personal crimes 
; 9  Cf. JoN L.  BREEN,  NovEL VERDICTS: A GuiDE TO Cou RTROOM FICTION ( 1 984) 
(cri tical bibliograph y ) .  
· 
60 Cf. JOHN B ENDER,  IMAGIN ING THE PENITENTIARY :  FICTION AND THE ARC HITEC­
TURE OF M I N D  I N  E IG HTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 1 1-42 ( 1 987) (noting that attitudes 
toward prison formulated between 1 7 1 9  and 1 779 i n  narrative l i terature and art sustained 
and enabled the conception and construction of actual penitentiary prisons in  the late 
1 8th century ) .  
6 1  See generally WILLIA M S  S. H OLDSWORTH, C HARLES DICKENS AS A LEGAL H I STO­
RIAN ( 1 928 )  (exploring legal dimensions of Bleak House and other novels by Dickens) . 
62 See generally R . D .  McM ASTER, TROLLOPE AND THE LAW 1 ( 1 986) ("plots of [Trot­
lope ' s  ( 1 8 1 5- 1 882)) novels repeatedly turn on points of law" and include approximately 
1 00 lawyers , solic itors , j u dges,  etc . ,  as characters ) .  
6 3  Sir  Walter Scott ( 1 7 1 7- 1 832)  was a lawyer and judge. See GEST,  supra note 1 7, a t  
102 .  
... 
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take on the aspect of, at wors t ,  tortious lapses of reasonable  care 
by her guardians .  64 
One character i n  the nove l , Mr .  Briggs ,  i s  a l egal actor, a 
lawyer. B riggs appears i n  the novel es sential ly as a messenger. 
He bears the new s ,  good and bad .  It is he who reveals 
Rochester ' s  prior marriage to Bertha Mason j ust as Jane and 
Rochester stand at the altar to be wed . Later, i t  is he who gives 
notice through St. John of Jane ' s  entit lement to her uncle ' s  estate . 
Legal events and characters are not the nove l ' s  only legal 
elements . L iteral and figurative uses  of the term " law" and i ts  
cognates ( lawfu l , l awfu l ly ,  lawgiver, lawgivers , lawles s ,  laws , and 
lawyer) appear some twenty-two t imes . 65 Courtroom terminol­
ogy, for example , "judge , "  "witnes s , "  "evidence , "  "plea," "sum­
mon ,"  i s  also pervasive . 66 
Accounting for the nove l ' s  law-re lated e lements suggests both 
a general inquiry and 'a  more specific one . The general i nquiry i s  
why legal terms , concept s ,  c haracters , and events would play a 
conspicuous role in any novel  or work of fict ion ;67 the specific i s  
why they play a cons picuous role  i n  Jane Eyre . Roscoe Pound 
wrote t hat fict ion writers constant ly  turn to law because " [t ]he 
administration of j ustice and the law in  action touch human l ife 
at so many vi tal  points and offer so many dramatic situations 
. . . .  "68 Richard Posner more recent ly made the s imilar obser­
vation t hat law i s  a frequent subject of l i terature because i t  i s  a 
dramatic , permanent , un iversal feature of human experi ence .69 
Posner emphasized that the discontinuity between the spiri t  and 
letter of the law makes law a superb metaphor for the arbitrary, 
coercive , and unjust  way in which l ife and the human condition 
64 The moral ly  blameless character of Bertha 's  i nsane acts complicates the theory that 
Bertha  Mason Rochester i s  a "criminal" version of Jane-her double. Cf. GILB E RT & 
GUBAR,  supra note 36,  at 360. 
6 5  See C. RUTH SABOL & TOD D  K. BENDER.  A CoNCORDANCE TO B RONTE ' s  JANE 
EYRE 305-35 ( 1 98 1 )  (word frequency table for words appearing in  Jane Eyre) .  
66 !d. a t  3 1 4-35 ( "judge" a n d  its cognates appear 4 5  times ; t h e  other terms appear a 
total of 1 5  L imes ) .  
67 Cf. BENDER ,  supra note  60 ,  at I I  (noting that the noun novella yielded our  term 
novel and meant an "addition to a l egal code" in late Lat in ;  criminal law categories have 
had an enormous organizational significance in the h istory of the novel ) .  
08 RosCOE POU N D, Introduction t o  L A W  I N  ACTION : AN ANTHOLOGY OF THE L A W  I N  
LITERATURE i x  (Amicus Curiae ed . 1 947) . 
69 PosNER,  supra note 1 7 ,  at 7 1 ,  74 , 76, 78 . Posner does argue ultimately, however, that 
the essential spiri t  of the law is not dramatic .  !d. at 79 . 
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are sometimes experienced . 70 I n  Jane Eyre i t  i s  precisely 
Rochester ' s  disgust with the gap between the spiri t  and the letter 
of Engl i sh  d ivorce law that leads him to attempt an act of b igamy 
he believes moral ly correct and ,  when that fail s ,  to advocate 
adulterous cohabitat ion in another jurisdiction .  Given the overall 
drama, or the melodrama,  of B ronte ' s  s tory, neither Pound nor 
Posner would be surprised by the prevalence of legal language , 
metap hors , and event s . 
Bronte scholar M argot Peters has done much to account for 
the legal language in  Jane Eyre . 7 1  Peters identified t hree dist inct 
levels of "courtroom" or "legal" language in  the novel : 
On the first level it i s  l i teral , necessi tated by the actual legal 
events in the novel . . . . The second level of language 
compri ses those terms whic h ,  because of the way they clus­
ter and because of the figurative resemblance of the scenes 
they describe to courtroom procedure , have almost certainly 
been used deliberately by  the author. Sometimes they occur 
metaphorically . . . .  The situations vary, however, in the 
degree to which they are figurative . . . .  Final ly ,  there is 
the language which occurs simply in  the natural course of 
narration where it has ostensibly nothing to do with either 
figurative or l iteral  legal process at all . 72 
Peters plausibly argues that the prevalence of the first two levels 
of legal language i s  explained by Jane Eyre ' s  design : i t  i s  "prin­
cipal ly a novel about man ' s  capacity for judgment . "73 More spe­
cifically, she argues that Jane Eyre i s  an "essentially radical" 
novel about the female capacity for personal judgment . 74 Peters 
hints that the third level of B ronte ' s  usage of legal language may 
have been more or less  unconscious . 75 
7 0  !d. at 77 . 
71 PETERS , supra note 4 .  
7 '  !d. a t  1 33-34 . 
73 !d. at 1 48 .  
74 !d. 
75 B ronte may have been i nfluenced to use legal language by her father's love of polit ics 
and by her fondness for reading newspapers . B ronte was fami liar with Wil l iam Shake­
speare ' s  legal i sms and the then popular lawyer-novelist Sir Walter Scott .  In fact ,  her 
bigamy plot may have been suggested by the plot of Scott 's  story The Betrothal. Finally,  
and opaquely,  Peters suggests t hat B ronte ' s  legal language may have been a result of her 
sharing qualit ies with her c haracter. From B ronte 's  passionate character one may i nfer 
that she possessed a strong gui l t  complex as a reclusive Victorian woman who craved 
physical or erotic love, independence ,  and adventure . !d. at 1 5 1-54. 
I 
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B .  Jurisprudence 
Documenting and accounting for the use of legal terms ,  meta­
phors, characters , and events in Jane  Eyre is a worthwhi le task 
admirab ly  pursued by others . I undertake a related but dist in­
gui shable task .  I connect Jane Eyre ' s  recognized legal elements 
to its overlooked legal e lement , namely its jurisprudence . I e lab­
orate the jurisprudence of Jane Eyre by examining the concepts 
and anal ytical categories  the novel shares with Engl i sh  legal phi­
losophy of its h is torical period . 
Normative order i n  Jane Eyre consists of what the nove l ,  
through i ts  pervasive legal metaphors , invites us to  think of  as 
spheres  of law. Normative order in th is  novel is thoroughly 
nomic, that i s ,  thoroughly  legal (consti tuted by l i teral l aw) and 
law-l ike (constituted by metaphorical law) . The spheres of law 
operative i n  the fictional world of Bronte ' s  novel are strikingly 
s imilar to the normative realms characterized as l iteral , meta­
phorical, or figurative spheres of law in the jurisprudence of John 
Austin and his phi losophical predecessors : the spheres of divine 
law, posit ive c ivi l  law, posit ive moral law, and the physical law 
of nature . 76 
B y  maintaining that Jane Eyre presupposes a conception of 
law reminiscent of John Austi n ' s, I do not mean to suggest  that 
Bronte was acquainted with Austi n ,  h is  ut i l itarian mentor Jeremy 
Bentham , or their writ ings .  77 Yet striking congruences manifest 
a shared Zeitgeis t  and a common intel lectual heritage . 78 I bel ieve 
Bronte was attempting t hrough fiction to work out phi losophical 
problems relating to the reconciliat ion of passion and reason , on 
the one hand , and autonomy (self-rule )  and hegemony (ru le  by 
others ) ,  on the other. She appears to have concluded t hat self-
76 See infra notes 85- 1 02 and accompanying text .  
77 See  TOM W I N N I FRITH . THE B RONTES AND THEIR  BACKGROUND :  ROMANCE AND 
REALITY 84 ( 1 988 ) .  Chapter S i x .  "The B rontes and the i r  Books ,"  careful ly surveys the 
books. periodical s .  and l ibraries  available to Charlotte B ronte and her family .  According 
to Winnifri th .  Charlotte may have read some of Charles Dickens'  fict ion,  but "the Brontes 
were exceptional in  that they were remarkably ignorant of contemporary novels . "  !d. at 
95. The obvious influences on Charlotte ' s  writ ing are the Bible , Shakespeare , B yron ,  and 
S ir  Walter Scott .  !d. at 84 . 
7� Thomas makes a stronger claim about the connections between certain jurists and 
novelists , documenting direct cross-fert i l ization through personal encounters . See , e .g . , 
THOMAS . supra note 56,  at 8-9. 
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rul e  consists of conquering one ' s  own passion sufficient ly to 
appreciate and accept the  legitimacy of rule by others . 
These same problems were among those addressed b y  political 
philosphers of the time .  Not everyone has a taste for academic 
philosophy, not everyone a taste for novels .  Also,  a literary text 
may be able to communicate certain ideas better than an abstract 
philosophical treatise ,  and vice versa . 79 Sti l l ,  both novelist and 
philosopher may, as B ronte and Austin did , use differing genres 
to address  identical problems and reach similar conclusions . 80 
The thoughtful justice in eyre struggling to align his judgment 
with the king ' s  expectations has an analogue in pensive Jane 
Eyre . As a woman novelist and a minister ' s  daughter who was 
denied interaction with the world of public affairs and the acad­
emy, B ronte shows through fiction that the problems of rational 
autonomy and legal constraint about which men write are also 
women ' s  problems . 
IV.  LAW ' S  FOU R  CONCEPTUAL FACES 
A.  John A ustin 's  Jurisprudence 
John Austin ' s  major  contribution to j urisprudence is a series 
of fifty-seven lecture s ,  the first of which was The Province of 
79 Cf. MARTHA C .  N usSBA U M ,  LovE's  KNOWLEDGE: EsSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY AND 
L ITERATURE 7 ( 1 990) .  N ussbaum contrasts abstract .  theoretical philosophical treatises to  
l iterary texts :  
(A]ny sty le  makes .  i tself. a statement :  that an abstract theoretical s ty le  makes ,  l ike 
any other style . a statement about what is important and what i s  not.  about what 
facult ies of the reader are important for knowing and what are not . There may 
then be certain plausible views about the nature of the relevant portions of human 
l ife that cannot be housed within [an abstract theoretical s tyle) without generating 
a pecul iar impl ic i t  contradiction .  
A s  examples o f  such "plausible views" incapable o f  being imputed via a n  abstract 
theoretical style ,  N ussbaum offers M arce l  Proust 's belief that "the most important truths 
about human psychology cannot be communicated or grasped by intellectual acti v ity 
alone" ; and H e nry James '  bel ief that "fine attention and good deliberation require a highly 
complex .  n uanced perception of. and emotional response to, the concrete features of 
one ' s  own context . "  !d. 
so But see H ugh F. Chorley, in C HA RLOTTE B RONTE, supra note 2, at 45 ("lane Eyre 
deserves high prai se .  and comme ndation to the novel-reader who prefers story to p hilos­
ophy, pedantry. or Puseyite controversy. ' ' ) . 
• 
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Jurisp rudence Determined, published in 1 83 2 . 8 1  Philosophers 
view the lectures as classic expressions of nineteenth-century 
legal positivism , 82 and as exemplars of the formalistic and analytic 
approaches to jurisprudence . The 1 873  posthumous edition of 
Austin ' s  lectures included elaborate , technical-looking fold-out 
charts il lustrating the interrelations among legal concepts and 
subjects . The "heavy, prosaic" style of Austin ' s  lectures lacks 
literary embellishments . 83 As delicately described by Sarah Aus­
tin ,  his wife , Austin ' s  hyper-analytical  lectures reflected "the 
severity of his taste and his habitual resolution to sacrifice every­
thing to clearness  and precision . "84 
Clearly and precise ly  stated in Austin ' s  writings is  a catalogue 
of how Westerners commonly use the concept of law. According 
to Austin , " [a] law, in the most general and comprehensive ac­
ceptation in which the term , in its literal meaning , is employed , 
may be said to be a rule laid down for the guidance of an intel­
ligent being by an intelligent being having power over him . "85 
The expre ssion "law" has fou r  primary designations  in Austin ' s  
work . H e  describes two of them as l iteral , two as analogical or 
metaphorical . 
In  one of its literal u se s ,  "law" refers to the class of laws set 
by God : the Divine law or the law of God. 86 Divine law, according 
to Austin , is often styled ambiguously and misleadingly the " law 
of nature" or "natural law. "87 " Law" is also used literall y  to apply 
to laws set by  men : positive law,  or law existing by position ,  that 
8 1 Aust in became a lawyer in 1 8 1 8 . I n  1 826 Jeremy Bentham and the newly formed 
University of London offered Aust in  the chair in Juri sprudence . To prepare , Aust in went 
to study legal phi losophy in  Germany. When he returned to London and began teaching,  
John S tuart Mil l  was among those who attended h i s  lectures .  I AusTI N ,  supra note 1 0 ,  
a t  v .  See generally WILLIAM L .  MoRISON,  JOHN A usTIN ( 1 982) (expl ication and crit icism 
of Austi n ' s  work and i ntel lectual biography) ; W I LFRID E .  RuMBLE ,  THE THOUGHT OF 
JOHN A U ST I N :  JU RISPRUDENCE ,  COLONIAL  R E FORM . AND THE B RITISH CONSTITUTION 
( 1 985) (prese ntation and crit ic ism of Aust in 's  thought and intel lectual biography) .  
8 �  See generally JosEPH RAZ. THE CoNCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM,  1 -43 (2d ed . 1 980) 
(critical presentation of Aust in ' s  t hought ) ;  Robert Moles, John Austin Reconsidered 36 
N .  IR. LEGAL Q. 1 93 ( 1 985) ;  W ilfrid E .  Rumble , John A ustin and His Nineteenth Century 
Critics: The Case of Sir Hem)' Sumner Maine,  39 N. IR .  LEGAL Q .  1 19 ( 1 988) .  
8 3  See Juuus STONE ,  THE PROVIN C E  A N D  FUNCTION OF LAW: LAW AS L oG I C ,  JusTICE 
AND SoCIAL CoNTROL :  A STUDY IN J u RI SPRUDENCE 56 ( Harv. Un iv .  Press 1 950) ( 1946). 
84 1 A U STIN,  supra note 1 0 ,  at 7. 
85 /d. at 86. 
8 6  /d. 
87 /d . 
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i s ,  by sovereign imposition . 88 Divine law i s  literal law because it 
is the law which the O mnipotent employs to rule His intell igent  
creations . Positive law qualifies as  literal law because i t  is  the 
law used by political superiors to rule intell igent inferiors . 
Under a third usage , this  one " improper" and based on "close 
and striking" analogies  to the aforementioned literal usages ,  
"law'' refers to  positive morality . 89 Positive morality consists of 
"rules set and enforced b y  m ere opinion , that i s ,  by  the opinions 
or sentiments held or fel t  by  an i ndeterminate body of men in 
regard to human conduct . "90 Austin defined positive morality to 
include customs ,  conve ntions , mores ,  " (t]he law of honour," 
"[t]he law set by  fashio n , "  and " [i ] nternational law" :  morality as 
it should be, or would be if it conformed to divine law. 9 1  
The fourth and final usage of "law" identified by Austin is  the 
metaphorical or figurative use which he found responsible for 
deluging the field of j urisprudence and morality with muddy spec­
ulation .  92 " Law" i s  commonly used to refer to physical forces  
affecting the behavior of  lower animal s ,  plants , and inanimate 
objects : "Such is  the case when we talk of laws observed by the 
lower animals ; of hnvs regulating the growth or decay of vege­
tables ; of laws determining the movements of inanimate bodies 
or masse s .  "93 
When used in its l ite ral sense s ,  "law" entail s  the existence of 
a sovereign superior whose general commands inferior subjects 
habitually obey out of fear of negative sanction .  For purposes of 
the science of jurisprudence , Austin defined "law" to exclude 
positive morality and natural physical forces . But , along with 
divine law and posit ive law, Austin recognized the cultural s ig­
nificance of analogical and metaphorical law as features of nor­
mative reality that he believed limit human freedom. 94 
True to its positiv i s t  label , the formal structure of Austin ' s  
analytical juri sprudence insists  upon a dist inction between posi­
tive civi l  law on the one hand , and all other forms of law on the 
88 /d. at 87 .  
89 /d. 
'!() /d. 
9 1  /d. at 87-88 .  
9' /d. at 8 8 .  
"-' /d. 
94 !d. at 87 .  
--
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other. Formal ly speaking,  therefore , the posit ive law and "natural 
law" are d is tinct . Law is not s imply an abstract principle of 
reason . It i s  not a precept of divinely inspired reason as Thomas 
Aquinas maintained . 95 Law is a brute empirical fact ,  an act of an 
earthly sovereign , as moral or immoral as the sovere ign chooses 
to be. Austin v iewed the poss ib i li ty that the obligations generated 
by two or more spheres of law would conflict as mainly theoret­
ical . 96 He bel ieved , for example ,  that i n  theory a positive c ivi l  
law could require of persons that which posit ive moral l aw 
abhorred . 97 But he also bel ieved that such i nstances of non­
convergence were exceptional in modern , c ivi lized societi e s .  98 
Consistent with these be liefs ,  Austi n ' s  ph ilosophical and poli tical 
writings reflect a tendency toward conservatism . 99 
Austin was not alone i n  be lieving i n  the virtual unity of nor­
mative order. His  precursor, Thomas Hobbes ,  maintained an 
exceptionall y  s trong version of this view. Hobbes wrote that the 
civi l  law consists  of the commands of earthly sovereigns , but that 
the natural Jaw is nonethe less  "contained" in  the civi l  law, the 
civi l  law "contained" in the natural law.  1 0° For Hobbes ,  the re­
c iprocal containment of natural and posit ive l aw entails that 
judges may interpret the commands of the sovereign as necessary 
by appeal to natural law. Continuing the posit ivist tradit ion of 
Hobbes and Austin into our own l ifet imes , Brit ish phi losopher 
H. L . A .  Hart s tressed the virtual unity of normative order in h is  
doctrine t hat , given survival as  an a im,  there are "universally 
recognized principles of conduct" which may be considered the 
"minimum content of Natural  Law. " 1 0 1 That i s ,  the "minimum 
9 5  THOMAS AQUINAS .  ST. THOMAS AQUINAS :  PH I LOSOPHICAL TEXTS 353-66 (Thomas 
Gilby trans . ,  1 960).  
Y 6  Cf. Samuel E. Stumpf, A ustin 's Theory of the Separation of Law and Morals , 1 4  
VAND.  L .  REv.  1 1 7 ,  1 27 ,  1 40 ( 1 96 1 ) ( there i s  " a  far more int imate relation between law 
and morals [in posit iv is ts '  theories] than posit ivists usually admit" ) .  
9 7  I AusTIN , supra note 10 .  at I 1 6-22 .  
YH !d. at 1 1 7 ,  1 22 .  
99 Austin was considerably less reform-minded than Bentham or  Mi l l .  H e  praised the 
English government of h is  day as ' ' the most democratical [sic) of all governments ,  past 
and present ,"  more democratic than the U n ited States ,  which permitted slavery. Yet he 
opposed universal suffrage and opposed Parl iamentary reforms designed to increase the 
d irect power of the lower and middle classes whose " interests and opinions" he believed 
the sovereign "habitual l y  consulted . "  J . S .  Mi l l , Recent WriTers on Reform: Austin 's Plea 
for the Constitution , 59 F RASER 489, 49 1-93 ( 1 859) . 
100 THOMAS HOBBES ,  LEVIATHAN 1 99-200 ( Michael Oakeshott ed . . 1 962) ( 1 65 1 ) .  
1 0 1  H . L . A .  H ART, THE CONCEPT O F  LAW 1 89 ( 1 96 1 ) .  
1 96 Harvard Women ' s  Law Journal [Vol. 1 5  
content of natural law' '  i s  i n  fact embedded i n  the rule s  of positive 
law. In  Hart ' s  view, that which autonomous ,  rational , self-inter­
ested individuals are l ike ly  to want for themselves and others is 
what the ru les of l aw provide . 1 02 
B.  Jane Eyre 's  Jurisprudence 
The virtual unity of normative order-the perspective em­
braced by a long l ine of Engl ish legal philosophers that the laws 
of God , civi l  government ,  moral custom,  and the physical world 
require virtual ly the same conduct of human agents in viable 
societies-is the perspective embraced by B ronte ' s  heroine . In­
deed , Jane ' s  happiness in the novel comes only when she has 
recognized her own autonomy and yet reconciled herself to con­
formity with l aw in each of Austin's four sense s .  Jane does not 
announce ,  "I am final ly reconciled with law in each of four sens­
es ,"  but her narrative shows that she has achieved such 
reconci l iation . 
Jane's journey is  a kind of "eyre . " 1 03 The "sovereign" in  whose 
name she journeys i s  neither her own impulses nor the whims of 
others ; her " sovereign" is  the four-faced canon of rules and prin­
ciples that are conducive to happines s .  Jane bel ieves human in­
dividual s are subject to rules  and principles that are not of their 
own design , but that neve;·theless safeguard their rational self­
interest s .  As a rational , autonomous judge with the moral equiv­
alent of the "commiss ion in  eyre , "  an individual may speak and 
apply the l aw of human h appines s .  However, under Jane ' s  juris­
prudence not even a j udge who acts under sovereign power has 
the authority to invent or ignore the law. Recall ing a moment of 
self-crit ic i sm,  Jane metaphorical ly refers to being "arraigned at 
[her] own bar. " 1 04 But her point i s  that she i s  her own stern judge , 
not her own source of law. 
"" !d. at ! 89 .  Cf. Ian Duncanson . The Strange World of English Jurisprudence,  30 N .  
l R .  LEGAL Q .  207 , 224 ( ! 979) (arguing that  jurisprudential analyses of Engl ish law are 
unconnected with the law ' s  actual government of ind ividual s ) .  
103 Cf G I L B E RT & G u B A R ,  supra note 36.  at 3 ! 4 ,  342 ( st ressing Jane Eyre as "p i lgrim") .  
See generally supra note 34 . 
1 0" B RONT E .  supra note 4 ,  at 1 40 .  
-
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V. RETELLING JANE E YRE 
The ground has now been laid for recounting the story of Jane 
Eyre in  a way that wi l l  permit the unfolding of  i ts  implicit juris­
prudence . In the course of retelling the story, I wil l  introduce 
passages from the works of Austin and , to a lesser extent ,  Ben­
tham. The phi losophers' texts convey disti nct theoretical under­
standings of law and related concepts . Many of these same un­
derstandings figure prominently in Jane ' s  powerful narration of 
her experiences .  They emerge from Jane ' s  metap horical and l it­
eral uses of a juridical vocabulary fami l iar to nineteenth-century 
phi losophers , lawyers and B ronte ' s  educated public . 
Jane shares with Austin and B entham a basic bel ief that l iberty 
i s  a component of ind�vidual happiness and that legal constraints 
on l iberty  are necessary evil s . 1 05 B entham wrote : 
No law can ever be made but what trenches upon l iberty :  
if i t  stops there , i t  i s  so  much pure ev i l :  if i t  i s  good upon 
the whole, i t  must be in  virtue of something that comes after 
. . . .  To make a law is to do evil  that good may come . 1 06 
In one respect , Jane ' s  narrat:ion shares the classical ly uti l i tarian 
dimension of Austi n ' s  and Bentham' s  thought .  Jane assumes that 
happiness  is the point of nomic order. Jane thus measures the 
worth of law by reference to i ts  consequences for happines s .  
Remarkably,  while Jane ' s  words sometimes suggest the phi loso­
phers ' conceru for aggregate happiness  and the caretaker's con­
cern for the happiness  of others c lose at hand , her narrative I S  
primarily  driven by :oEcern for her own happines s .  
105 See M . H .  H oeflich ,  John A usrin and Joseph Srory :  Two Nineteenth Century Per­
spectil·es on the Utility of the Ci1·il La11 · j()l· the Common Lawver, 29 A M .  J .  L EGAL HIST.  
36 ( 1 985) ; Patric k  J .  Kel ley . 0/il·er Wendell Holmes,  Utilitarian Jurisprudence and the 
Positi1·ism of John Stuart Mill , 30 A M .  J .  J u RIS .  1 89 ( 1 985 ) ;  Wilfr id  E. Rumble .  Di1·ine 
Lmt·, Utilitarian Ethics and Positi1·ist Jurisprudence : A Srudv of the Legal Philosophy of 
John Austin , 24 A M .  J .  JURIS .  1 39 ( 1 979) .  
10 6  JEREMY B ENTH A M ,  THE LiM ITS oF JU RISPRU DENCE DEFINED 1 39 ( Charles Warren 
Everett ed . ,  1 945) .  
1 98 H arvard Wome n ' s  Law Journal [Vol . 1 5  
Jane al so shares Austin ' s  and Bentham ' s  conception of law as 
a product of sovereignty :  1 07 
Every law or rule . . .  i s  a command 1 08 
Laws and other commands are said to proceed from su­
periors , and to b ind or oblige inferiors . . . .  [T]he term 
superiority signifies might :  the power of affecting others with 
evil or pain ,  and of forcing them, through fear of that evi l , 
to fashion their conduct to one ' s  wishe s . 1 09 
Every posit ive l aw, or every l aw simply and strict ly  cal led , 
i s  set b y  a sovereign person , or a sovereign body of persons , 
to a member or members of the independent political society 
wherein that person or body is  a sovereign or supreme . 
The superiority which i s  styled sovereignty . . .  i s  dist in­
guished from other superiority . . .  by the fol lowing marks 
or characters .-1 . [T]he bulk of the given society are in a 
habit  of obedience or  submission to a determinate and com­
mon superior . . . .  2. That certain indiv idual , or . . .  [a] 
body is not in a habit of obedience to a determinate human 
superior. 1 1 0 
I t  i s  manifest  that t he state (or sovereign government) is  not 
restrained by positive l aw from dealing with al l  things within 
its territory at i ts own p leasure or discretion .  If it were , it  
would not be a sovere ign government . . . . 1 1 1  
Hobbes bel ieved that true sovereignty i s  unrestrained and i n­
divis ibl e .  1 1 2  H e  also be l ieved , problematical ly ,  that a sovere ign 
10 7  See H .  Coing, Bentha m 's Importance in  the  De1 •e/opment of lnteressenjurisprudenz. 
and General Jurisprudence 2 T H E  l R .  JuRIST 336 ( 1 967 ) ;  H . L . A . Hart , Bentham on 
So1·ereignty 2 THE lR. JURIST 327 ( 1 967) .  See also D . A .  Burnet , The Reality of Sovereignty 
and tlze Sovereignty of Reality 67 ARCHlY FUR REC HTS UNO SOZIALP H I LOSO P H I E  5 3 4 ,  
5 3 8  ( 1 98 1 )  ( d iscussing Aust in  on sovereignty) .  C.f. W.J . Rees ,  The TheOtJ' of SOI 'ereignty 
Restated 59 M I N D  496 ( 1 950) (analyzing Aust in ' s  conception of sovereignty as being 
concerned with authority, not force) .  
108 1 A uST I N , supra note 1 0 .  at 88.  
10" !d. at 96. 
1 1 0  !d. at 220.  
I I I Jd. at 84 1 .  
1 1 2 Ho B B E S .  supra note 1 00 .  at 1 34-4 1 .  See generally Mark Francis ,  The Nineteenth 
Cent11ry TlzeoJ}' of So1·ereigntv and Thomas Hobbes 1 H IST. PoL.  THOU GHT 5 1 7  ( 1 980) . 
-
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can remain sovereign whi le de legat ing power to ,  or  recognizing 
power in , publ ic and private actors . 1 1 3 Austin held a s imi lar view : 
[A] l l  t hings with in  the  territory of the state are res publicae ,  
o r  belong t o  the s tate . . . .  [T]hose [ things ] ,  the enjoyment 
or use  of which i t  leaves or concedes to determinate private 
person s ,  are commonly called res privatae .  1 1 4 
Of rights  ex ist ing over person s ,  and avail ing agains t  other 
persons general ly ,  I may cite the fol lowing examples :-[t]he  
right of  the  father  to  the  custody and education of the 
chi ld :-the right of the  guardian to the  custody and educa­
tion of the ward :-the right of the master to the services of 
the slave or servant . . . .  [T]hese rights are rights  in per­
sonam : that i s  to say, t hey are right s answering to obliga­
tions . . . which are i ncumbent exclusively upon those de­
terminate individual s .  In  case the ch i ld or ward desert the 
father or guardian , or  refuse the l e s sons of the teachers 
whom the father  or  guardian has appointed , the father  or 
guardian may compel him to return , and may punish  h im 
with due  moderation for h i s  laziness or  perversenes s .  If the 
s lave run from his work, the master may force h im back ,  
and drive h im to h i s  work by chast isement . 1 1 5 
Heads of households  and private property owners in  Jane  Eyre 
act ,  in a sense , both as sovereigns and for sovereigns .  But  the 
dependent wives ,  ch i ldren , servants ,  employees ,  and poor rela­
t ions appearing in the novel are subject to the "Jaw" of household 
"sovereigns"  in an addit ional re spect :  " [A]  man i s  subject to any 
and to every sovereign who can make him suffer :  whether i t  be 
in person (that is in body or in mind) [ , ]  in reputation , in property, 
or in condition .  " 1  1 6  
Jane ' s  narration i s  not  completely consonant w i th  every aspect 
of the legal outlook of her ph i losophic contemporari e s .  For ex­
ample ,  even as a ch i ld  Jane i s  cognizant of the misery and deg­
radation s laves can feel  in a regime of legal ly enforced involuntary 
1 1 ·1 H o B B E S ,  supra note 1 00 .  at 1 39 .  204-05 . Bentham s hared t h i s  be l ief. See H art . supra 
note 1 07 .  at 327 .  
1 1 4 2 A U ST I N ,  supra note  33 ,  at 84 1 .  
1 1 5 I A U ST I N ,  supra note 1 0 . at 384. 
1 1 " B ENTH A M .  s upra note 1 06 .  at 1 02-03 n . 4 .  
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servitude .  She accuses her cous in John Reed of being a "[ w]icked 
and cruel boy . . .  [ , ]  l ike  a murderer . . .  [ , ]  a s lave-driver . . .  [ , ]  
l ike the Roman Emperors . " 1 1 7  Her  emphatic condemnation of the 
society that defines some people as s laves and as "things .
, 
con­
trasts starkly with Austin ' s  d ispassionate insistence that 
[ i ]t i s  not true that the Roman Lawyers ranked slaves with 
things .  Or, if i t  be true , it  i s  only true [ in a l imited sense ] . 
And ,  admitting that the Roman Lawyers ranked slaves with 
things , it fol lows not that they were cold-b looded men , and 
i ntended to degrade and vi l ify the miserable s lave . In styl ing 
the s lave a thing ,  they considered him from a cert::tin aspect : 
namely as being the  subject of a right residing in  another 
person , and avai l ing against th ird persons . 1 1 �  
However, Jane cannot herself speak dispassionately about slav­
ery. Unl ike Austin , Jane communicates an understanding that a 
person who is  neither l iteral ly  a slave nor legally  a thing can 
nonetheless  fee l  l ike both . I ndeed , Jane ' s  story sets forth how 
she escapes becoming a "th ing" in that "certain aspect" defined 
by law as s lavery. 
A .  Law as a Product  of Sovereignty : Gateshead 
In the opening chapters of Jane Eyre , Jane recounts scenes 
from the tenth year of her unhappy l ife among the Reeds at 
Gateshead Hal l . Her parent s ,  a poor clergyman and a dis inherited 
gentlewoman , are dead . The orphan l ives with the widow of her 
mother' s brother, John Reed , and three juvenile cous ins ,  John ,  
Georgiana,  and El iza .  A spoiled teen-aged bul ly,  John seeks out 
Jane for special abuse .  Jane ' s  adoptive family treats her badly.  
Her aunt and female cousins prefer to ignore her.  Bessie , one of 
the household servants , treats Jane with kindness ; but the other 
servant ,  Abbott , shares the family ' s  disaffection . 
Jane presents her l ife at Gateshead as an object lesson in  the 
nature and abuses of law as a product of civi l  and domesti c 
1 1 7 B RONTE . supra note 4 .  at 8 .  
1 1 ' I AUST I N ,  supra note 1 0 .  a t  388 .  
• 
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sovereignty. John Austin ' s  account of the law i l luminates the 
social order presented in  the initial chapters of the nove l .  Law, 
Austin maintains ,  is  the product of sovereignty, the commands 
of a superior to an inferior, backed by sanctions .  For the Austi­
nian positivist ,  the civi l  law of mid-nineteenth-century E ngland 
prevai ls  as the u ltimate law of Gateshead Hal l .  Although this law 
is not recited with particularity in the novel , B ronte depicted i t  
by implication .  1 1 9 Consi stent with well-established l i terary con­
ventions ,  B ronte sets her ( Jane ' s) fictional autobiography in E ng­
land ' s  actual l egal society yo B ronte ' s  contemporaries  probably 
understood that their law was present in and constitutive of the 
novel is t ' s  world of make-bel ieve . Readers today may require 
knowledge of legal h is tory to make complete sense of the world 
Bronte invokes . 1 2 1 
England' s  monarchical sovereign i s  Gateshead ' s sovereign . 
The Reeds are a proper, l aw-abiding family.  They l ive wholly 
within the parameters of posit ive civi l  law. Mrs .  Reed possesses 
just  those rights and privi leges a widow with chi ldren , including 
a male heir, would have been expected to posses s .  Although John 
1 1 9 Cf. Kendal l  L .  Walton.  Pictures and A-fake-Believe,  82 PH IL .  R E V .  283 , 288 ( 1 973) 
(dist inguishing the fictional ly  true from the fictional ly fal se) .  Walton writes :  
I t  would be desirable to have a generalized account of what i t  i s  for something to  
be fictional ly  true rather than fictionally false . But  providing one would be enor­
mously difficult  . . . .  Of course there wi l l  be i nstances in which it is h ard to decide 
whether or not a proposit ion i s  fictional ly  true , just as i t  i s  sometimes difficult  to 
determine what i s  ( l iteral l y )  true . 
. . . What determines the fict ional truth value of a proposition varies with the 
proposition and with the context .  I n  some cases fictional truths are l inked to facts 
about the real worl d ,  to hteral truths .  
See also Kendaii L. Walton , Fiction , Fiction-Making, and Styles of Fictionality , 7 PHI L .  
& L ITERA'IURE 78-8 1 ( 1 983)  (contending that speech-act theory, panicularly t h e  idea that 
fictional texts are not vehicles of i l locutionary act s ,  does not adequately explain fiction ) .  
12° Cf. Kendall L .  Walton, Fearing Fictions 75  J .  PH I L .  5 ,  1 1  ( 1 978) (Analogizing fiction 
to a game,  Walton writes ,  "Principles of make-be l ieve that are in force in a game need 
not have been formulated expl ic i t ly  or del iberatel y  adopted ." ) .  
1 2 1  See THOMAS, supra note 56,  at 7 :  
Reading . . .  l i terary texts i n  t h e  comext o f  legal h is tory can enhance an analysis 
of their ideology i n  a variety of ways . . . .  [A] crit ic intent on ideological analys is  
cannot be content with recovering the surface meani ng of a text  but must recon­
struct i ts  h istorical horizon ,  in order to re-pose the questions to which its narrative 
i s  an imaginary solution. A knowledge of legal h istory can greatly faci litate this 
act of reconstruct ion . 
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Reed ' s  gambling and debaucheries lead him to ruin as an adult ,  
there i s  n o  hint  i n  the  novel  that Mrs . Reed and her chi ldren  do 
not l ive i n  conformity  to the minimal requirements of c iv i l  law. 
While Jane l ives at Gateshead , the Reeds maintain their propert y, 
meet their civi l  obligat ions ,  and commit no crimes .  
The Engl i sh  sovere ign c irca 1847 , when Jane Eyre was first 
published , delegated sovere ignty over the household to men . As 
Bentham wrote ,  "The mandates of the master, the father, the 
husband , the guardian , are all of them the mandates  of the sov­
ereign : if not , then neither are those of the general nor of the 
judge . " 1 22  Bentham was nevertheless reluctant to yield to the 
popular tendency to  refer to the orders of the master to h i s  
servant ,  or a husband to h i s  wife or chi ld as  "law . "  L ike  Austi n ,  
Bentham urged that such uses were figurative . 1 23 
In Bronte ' s  England , wive s ,  ch i ldren ,  and servants had some 
rights against husbands ,  fathers , guardians ,  and employers . How­
ever, men ' s  s tatus with in the household was superior as a matter 
of posit ive civi l  law and posit ive moral law. Indeed , feminists of 
B ronte ' s  era were already arguing that married women were 
nothing short of "slaves" : 1 24 
For feminists , o ne of the most striking manifestations of 
this  marital " slavery" was the fact  that under the common 
law a wife was in  many ways regarded as the property of 
her husband . . . .  [A] married woman could not sue or be 
sued unless  her h usband was also a party to the suit , could 
not s ign contracts unless  her husband joined her, and could 
not make a valid will unless  he consented to its provisions . 
Further, a man as sumed legal rights over his  wife ' s  property 
at marriage , and any property that came to her during mar­
riage was legal ly  h i s  . . . .  [A] woman ' s  personal property ,  
including the  money she might have saved before her  mar­
riage or earned whi le  married ,  passed entirely to her h usband 
for him to use and d ispose of as he saw fit . Other laws 
1 22 B ENTHA M .  supra note 1 06 .  a t  1 05 .  
123  /d. at 4 .  
124  Typical affluent Englishwomen probably enjoyed considerably more legal protection 
than American slaves.  See generally WILL IAM GOODELL ,  THE A M E RICAN S LAVE CoDE 
IN THEORY AND PRACT ICE :  ITS DISTI NCTIVE f EATURES SHOWN BY ITS STATUTES .  Ju­
DICIAL DECIS IONS A N D  ILLUSTRATIVE fACTS (New American L ibrary 1 969) ( 1 85 3 )  (de­
scribing in  detail  the legal situation of American slaves) .  
.... 
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consonant with coverture reinforced a husband ' s  authority : 
he decided the fami ly domici le ,  he  had the right to correct 
his  wife physically ,  and he determined how and where their 
chi ldren  would be raised . . . .  
Aggravating a married woman' s  pl ight was the fact that i t  
was extremely difficult for her to extricate herself from the 
bonds of matrimony. Prior to the Divorce Act of 1 857 the 
only way to end a marriage other than by ecclesiastical 
annulment was by  private Act of Parl iament . . . .  1 25 
Thus as a ten-year-old chi ld l iv ing in a private home , Jane ' s  
immediate sovereign i s  the sovereign of the household .  The sov­
ereign of E ngland is the ult imate source of law for Jane ,  but the 
sovereign of Gateshead , designated by posit ive law and positive 
morality,  i s  a source of law of greater immediate impact . 
If the law of Gateshead applies to Jane at the direction of the 
Engl i sh  sovereign , who serves as the sovereign of Gateshead?  
Who i s  the  proximate source of  Gateshead ' s  law? The elder Mr. 
John Reed is dead . It first appears that his widow serves as 
Gateshead ' s  sovereign . In dealing with the outside world ,  Mrs . 
Reed alone act s  on behalf of Gateshead . However, ins ide the 
household , she has a more ambiguous status .  Her deceased hus­
band ' s  male heir i s  something of a rival for her authority .  
The first paragraphs of the novel focus on Jane ' s  inferiority to 
Mrs . Reed .  The aunt appears to be the dominate source of ex­
ternal norms in the chi ld ' s  life . Mrs .  Reed sets dinner at an 
"early" 1 20 hour to suit  her taste . Mrs . Reed prescribes long walks 
for the chi ldren , even on "chil ly afternoons . " 1 27 Physical ly  fragil e ,  
Jane resents the  compul sory walks . The cold weather "nip[s]  
fingers and toes" 1 28 and saddens her heart . Aunt Reed ban ishes 
dour l itt le Jane from the fami ly drawing room , describing the 
fami ly c ircle  as one of the "privi leges intended only for contented , 
happy, l itt le chi ldren .  " 1 29 Like the despot whom Bentham once 
imagined , Mrs . Reed d ispenses privilegia "for the grat ification of 
"-' MARY L Y N DON S H A N L E Y ,  fEMIN ISM ,  MARRIAGE AND THE LAW IN VICTORIAN 
ENGLAND,  1 850-1 895 8-9 ( 1 989 ) .  
1 �" B RONTE,  supra note 4 ,  a t  5 .  
"7 !d. 
I CH fd. 
1�9 !d. 
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[her] own particular passions or those of some individual favor­
ite . " 1 30 Jane prmests her  exclusion . Jane ' s  demand for an ade­
quate account of why she should be turned out is  the novel ' s  first 
and stark demonstration of her sense of justice and injustice .  The 
ideal of moral autonomy and moral justice demands such a ra­
tional accounting. Aunt Reed grants Jane no appeal . "Jane ,"  she 
states ,  " I  don ' t  l ike cavi l lers or questioners . " 1 3 1 When i t  comes 
to Jane , Aunt Reed e schews due proces s .  She expect s  her first 
word to stand as the final law. Reminding Jane that she is  both 
rightless and an inferior, Aunt Reed nonetheless intimates fear of 
juvenile menace : " [T]here is  something truly forbidding in  a child 
taking up her elders . . . .  " 1 32 
Not penitent for the usurpation implied by her request for due 
process ,  Jane sequesters herself behind the "red moreen curtain" 
of the window seat in  search of repose . 1 3 3 She takes with her 
Bewick 's History of British Birds , a favorite from the household 
library , drawing sustenance from mental images i t  inspires of 
"solitary rocks and promontories" and frigid "forlorn regions of 
dreary space . " 1 34 Lac king kindness  from al l  and fee ling physical ly 
and emotionally cold , Jane i s  drawn to pictures of ice-encased 
" [a]lp ine heights . ' ' 1 35 l t  is  win cer, l i teral ly ,  under the namral 
world ' s  law of seaso n s ,  when the novel begins , and Jane i s  in  a 
metaphorical1y wintry season of her life .  
Mrs . Reed "[ i] s an exact ,  clever manager, her household and 
tenantry [a)re thoroughly under her control ; her children , only, 
at t imes defTyJ her authority, and [laugh] it  to scorn . " l:i6 Although 
Aunt Reed can usually dominate Jane , and order about her ser­
vants and daughters , her son i s  less  plainly within her control . 
He " sometimes revi le[s]  her for her dark skin ,  similar to his own ; 
biumly disregard[s ]  her wishes" and tears her "si lk attire . " 1 37 The 
latitude she extends him our of a surfeit of love undercuts her 
1 3" S e e  B ENTH A M ,  supra note 1 06 ,  a t  1 62 .  
1 3 1 BRONTE,  supra note 4 ,  a t  5 .  
1 32 !d. 
I ) )  fd. 
1 34 ld. at 6 .  
1 3.1 Jd. 
u�o /d. at 30 .  
1 3 7  Jd.  at 1 2 . 
... 
.. 
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authority and grants h im the power to exercise a cruel and arbi­
trary freedom . 
Although Mrs . Reed can lay claim to sovereignty at Gateshead , 
her fourteen-year-old son i s  a close competitor. He clearly re­
gards himself as Jane ' s  superior, as evidenced by his  insistence 
that she address him as "Master, " by  his demand that she leave 
her window seat , and by his s triking her. His  boyish knowledge 
of male prerogative under the Engl i sh  positive law of inheritance 
and customary moral l aw fuels  his bold assertion of power within 
the household . He expects to stand where his father had stood . 
As John tell s  Jane ,  "al l  the house belongs to me , or wil l  do in  a 
few years . " 1 38 His  conduct ful ly  anticipates the vesting of what 
Austin label led the "contingent rights" of the eldest and only 
minor male heir. 1 39 B ronte ' s  prose emphasizes John ' s  superior 
status . Compared to Jane he is  older, larger, mal e ,  rich ,  and 
preferred by his mother. 
Echoing Bentham , Austin defined the sovereign of a people as 
him to whom the bu lk  of a population is habitually obedien t . 1 40 
I t  is  to Master John that Jane i s  hab itual ly  obedient .  I t  i s  he who 
puts the greatest fear in Jane . Jane in  fact describes her relation­
ship to John in  starkly Austinian terms : "Habitually obedient to 
John , I came up to h i s  chair . " 1 4 1 John sits in a c hair as a monarch 
in a throne , to declare j udgment and execute corporal punish­
ment . John i s  piaintiff, witnes s ,  prosecutor, judge , and j ury. Just 
as Jane can get no accounting from her aunt ' s  j udgment ,  she can 
expect none from Joh n ' s .  "I ha[ve] no appeal whatever against 
either h is  menaces or  h is  inftiction s , " : 42 she report s .  Jane i s  not 
merely a subject who must ,  to use Hobbes ' metaphor, chain  her 
ears to the lips of a sovereign ; she views herself as a subject 
slave on a short ieas h .  Hobbes imagined that absolute sovereign 
power is consensual under the terms of a hypothetical rational 
compact ; the chi ld Jane  fosters no such i l lusions .  
Jane refers to  a pattern of  continual abuse at  Gateshead . S he 
re lates two , of what the reader must assume are many, instances 
Ds !d. at 8 .  
1 39 2 AuSTIN ,  supra note 3 3 ,  a t  859 -63 . 
140 !d. at 220.  
1 , 1  B RONTE , supra note 4, at 8 .  
1>2 !d . 
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of physical violence .  B oth  occur on the same day and involve 
John Reed . In  the first  violent i nstance , John is  angry because of 
Jane ' s  imprudent demand for an account of why h is  mother had 
turned her out of the drawing room ,  her subsequent escape to 
the window seat , her borrowing Bewick 's  History of British Birds , 
and the defiant look i n  her eyes .  John therefore demands that 
Jane leave the window seat to receive judgment and punishment 
for contempt of authority. John arrogates to himself the "doubl e  
capacity of plaintiff as wel l  a s  Judge" that Bentham seemed t o  
think was warranted w here , for e xample ,  "the act of delinquency 
in a penal concern happens under his eye , so that there i s  nobody 
can tell him any more of the matter than he knows already 
" 143 
John Reed ' s  "thick "  1 44 l ips announce Gates head ' s  civi l  and 
criminal law. He lectures  Jane on the nature of property rights . 
Bentham ' s  words reflect John ' s  l egal presumptions :  "The taking 
or keeping, or using,  or damaging a thing by one who is conscious 
of his  having no tit le so to do . . .  constitute[s] under different 
sets of circumstances so many e xtraordinary offenses agains t  the 
law of property ."  1 45 John Reed assumes that he owns Gateshead 
and all in i t .  Jane owns nothing. The books Jane reads belong to 
him . By al l  rights she "ought to beg" for her survival . 1 46 John 
underscores Jane ' s  lack of identity as a person , and her inabil ity 
to escape to a world beyond his  contro l ,  by  ordering her to " [g]o 
and stand by the door, out of the way of the mirror and win­
dows . " 1 47 Master John , Jane ' s  self-appointed judge , l i terally  
throws the book at  her. 
John ' s  battery of Jane , drawing blood, leads to the second 
scene of violence at Gateshead : fal se imprisonment . B laming Jane 
for the children ' s  scrap , Mrs . Reed sentences Jane to the Red 
Room ,  the cold , remote upper chamber in  which the late Mr. 
Reed died .  Jane ' s  impri sonment may indicate that Mrs . Reed 
14-' BENTH A M ,  supra note 1 06 .  a t  304. 
1 44 B RONTE. supra note 4 ,  at 7 .  
145 B ENTHA M .  supra note 106 .  at 298 . 
146 B RONTE, supra note 4 ,  at 8 .  Abbott shares John Reed 's  sent ime n t .  She exhorts Jane 
to obey her young master. But Jane resists the lesson. "Master 1 How is he my master? 
Am I a servant'J"  Abbott ' s  st inging response to Jane ,  the penniless orphan . is that "You 
are less than a servant ,  for you do nothing for your keep ."  /d. at 9 .  
147 /d. at  8 .  
I 
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harbors a desperate wish that the ghost head of household return 
and subdue the perverse chi ld , the "rebel  s lave ," 148 whom neither 
his widow nor heir ful l y  could subdue .  1 49 
As Mrs . Reed orders , Bessie and Abbott carry Jane to the Red 
Room and place her on a stool . Jane springs from the stool and 
is  "arrested" by Bess ie  and Abbott Y0 B essie threatens  to tie Jane 
down with Abbott ' s  garters . In  a precocious display of self-dis­
cipl ine , Jane firmly attaches herself to her seat with her own 
hands rather than be tied down by "bonds , and the additional 
ignominy [they confer] . " 1 5 1 
Despite thi s ,  Abbott can see no signs of character i n  Jane . She 
is convinced that Jane is  an "underhand l ittle thing. " 1 52 Abbott ' s  
deference t o  the moral law of Gateshead stems from a bel ief that 
it is backed up by the divine law of God , ideal moral law. She 
warns Jane that if she does not repent something bad wil l  come 
down the chimney and fetch her away. More sympathetic ,  Bessie 
accounts for Jane ' s  youthful rebe l l ion as a fai lure yet to under­
stand the obligations of her inferiority : 
" You ought to be aware , Miss , that you are under obli­
gations to Mrs .  Reed : she keeps you: if she were to turn 
you off, you would have to go to the poor-house . " 
"What we tel l  you is  for your good,  . . .  you should try 
to be useful and pleasant , then ,  perhaps , you would have a 
home here ; but if you become passionate and rude , Miss is  
wi l l  send you away, I am sure . " 1 53 
'"' !d. at 9 .  
'"" See generolly BEN DER ,  supra note 60, at 2 0 4 .  The rat ionales for i solation in  the 
penitentiary (for which the  Red Room is  a surrogate) included : 
/d. 
( I ) a stress on the  fea1iul bu t  recuperative potential . . .  of sol i tude (or . . .  enforced 
si lence ) :  ( 2 )  the presumption t hat material c ircumstances will interact with con­
sciousness to alter behavior and to reform c haracter;  ( 3 )  the premise . . .  that the 
social ization of ind iv iduals depends upon t he mental representation of i mpersonal 
juridical proces s :  and (4) the inference that the structuring of t hese processes . . .  
requires systematic control of information and deployment of narrative resources .  
1 511 B RONTE.  supra note 4.  at  9 .  
t < t  !d. 
15� !d. at I 0 .  
t j )  !d. 
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Jane enters the Red Room physicall y  wounded but capable of 
self-discipl ine : she sits on her own hands .  Her self-discipl i ne 
comes from understanding:  she understands what i s  necessary if  
she i s  to avoid the mos t  severe form of constraint she bel ieves 
might come her way, Abbott ' s  garters . Jane knows she i s  treated 
badly because she is not a " sanguine , bri l l iant , carele s s ,  e xacting, 
handsome , romping child . " 1 54 Nature made her plain and pens ive . 
The l aws of physiognomy and psychology seem to j ust ify Mrs . 
Reed ' s  indifference . Jane fal l s  prey to es sential ism . How could 
any woman be expected to love an " interloper not of her race , 
and unconnected with her, after her husband ' s  death , by  any 
t ie?" 155 How could any woman be e xpected to be a ' 'parent to a 
strange child" 1 56 and to "see an uncongenial alien permanently 
intruded on her own fami ly  group?" 1 57 Nature ' s  law opposes Jane , 
and Jane i s  natural l y  unhappy. 
As  a chi ld , Jane views Gateshead' s  law, and the Engl i sh  society 
that al lows such domestic law to exist ,  as unjust .  As it pertains  
to her, she v iews the law of Gateshead not simply as  a l itt le 
unjust , but wholly so.  Jane is  well-fed , clothed , and spared the 
need to work . She l ives i n  the midst of wealth and priv i lege . 
Nonetheless , Jane views herself, hyperbol ically, as a s lave .  In 
her own mind , she i s  an oppressed subject of arbi trary, immoral 
sovereignty. 
Certainly ,  the early suppers , winter exercise , and social exclu­
sion imposed upon Jane by Mrs . Reed do not ri se to the levei of 
the inhumane s lavery practiced in nineteenth-century America. 
Moreover, Jane is too young to be a "slave" in  the senses i n  
which feminists of  the  period identified married women as  s laves . 
Bronte made her hero ine ' s  melodramatic self-identification as a 
slave more convincing by  subjecting her to the brutal dominance 
of John Reed.  
Jane ' s  sense of justice and injustice has been shaped by her 
untutored reading of h istory. She knows of the misdeeds of the 
Roman emperors Nero and Caligula . 1 58 She tel ls her readers that 
1 54 !d. at 1 2- 1 3 .  
1 55 !d. at 1 3 .  
1 56 !d. 
1 57 !d. 
1 58 Bentham. too . made rhetorical use of Caligula w make a poim about the " incom­
pleteness" of so-called customary law. BENTH A M .  supra note 1 06, at 282 . 
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as a chi ld she sees cousin John as l ike them-"like a murderer 
. . .  l ike a slave-driver. " 1 59 Jane describes herself as a rebel s lave 
whose frustrated desire for fairness and respect make her " l iable 
to strange penalties . " 1 60 Jane ' s  self-identification as a rebel s lave 
is l inked to her inability to accept her social position under Gates­
head ' s  law, a realm of private law that the public sovereign found 
"impossible" to penetrate . 16 1 
B y  contrast ,  the kindly ,  compliant Bess ie understands and ac­
cepts her own lot .  Bess ie  has , as H . L . A .  Hart might have said ,  
" internalized" the  law of  Gateshead . 1 62 She does not comply only 
or chiefly from fear of sanction as the young Jane doe s .  While 
J ane loves Bessie for her stories and songs ,  Jane i s  baffled by 
Bess ie ' s  quiet patience with the Reeds ' tyranny. Even patience 
strikes Jane as complicity. 
Although Jane feels  that her unjust treatment i s  wrong , she 
believes that i t  i s  natural . '" U njust !-unj ust ! '  said my reason , 
forced b y  the agonizing st imulus into precocious though transi­
tory powers of rat ional  cognition . " 1 63 Yet the irrational forces of 
emotion and superstit ion compete with reason in  the c hil d ' s  mind 
as she grows colder and increasingly i solated balanced on her 
hands on her stool . Jane sees herself in the looking-glass  as " l ike 
one of the t iny phantom s ,  half fairy, half imp , " 1 64 rather than a 
human being . S he begins to hope for the supernatural return of 
her dead uncle whom she imagines would punish those who 
perjure and oppress  her. In  the Red Room, Jane ' s  thoughts turn 
to running away and fasting unti l  death to escape her problems .  
These images presage her  actual response , years l ater, to  the  
discovery of  Rochester' s marriage to  B ertha. 
Jane ' s  suicidal thoughts lead her to fear she might , in fact ,  be 
the criminal others say she i s .  Jane feels alternate ly just and 
criminal , and correspondingly, alternately l ike a person and a 
thing. Jane refers to herself as "a heterogeneous thing,  opposed 
1 59 B RONTE . supra note 4 ,  at 8 .  
1 60 !d. at 9 .  
16 1 CI B ENTH A M ,  supra note 1 06 ,  at 269 (" For the legislator then to take any separate 
notice of them [ i . e . ,  parents ,  masters , and other domestic power-holders' "conveyances' '] 
i s  impossible . " ) .  
1 "� See generally H . L . A .  H A RT .  supra note 1 0 1 . at 85-88. 
1 63 B RONTE . supra note 4 .  at 1 2 .  
1 64 !d. at I I .  
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to [the Reeds] in temperament ,  i n  capacity, in propens i t ies ; a 
useless thing,  incapable  of serving their interes t ,  or adding to 
their pleasure ; a noxious thing . " 1 65 That others ' judgments about  
her  are so  different from her own indicate that they  and she do 
not share the same normative world .  The Reed household i s ,  
however, t h e  whole of humanity known t o  the chi ld . I t  fol lows 
that she can only view herself as an alien ,  a thing. I ndeed , she 
concludes that only a "thing" would fai l  to love her family .  
Through these contorted syllogisms , alone i n  the Red Room,  Jane 
views her moral difference and her lack of love as joint indicia 
of non-personhood. 
Hysteria i s  the re su lt of the contradiction in  Jane ' s  thoughts  
and feelings . 1 66 Jane screams out , but  her  pleas for forgiveness  
and an alternate form of punishment fal l  on deaf ears . Mrs . Reed 
lengthens her confinement . Left alone , Jane apparent ly suffers a 
" species of fi t . " 1 67 Strange dreams foreshadow the first encounter 
she wil l  have with Edward Rochester and his dog Pilot i n  a field 
near Thornfiel d .  
Jane ' s  fit  and subsequent i l lness lead t o  further alienation from 
the  Reeds .  Mrs . Reed as signs Jane to  i solated sleeping quarters , 
forces her to eat alone , and wholly bans her from the society of 
her family and their guest s .  Jane learns to love solitude and finds 
comfort i n  her dol l . But  Jane ' s  i l lness helps her to escape from 
the house-slave ' s  slavery of Gateshead . Her poor health leads 
Mrs . Reed , who did not th ink her good enough to warrant sum­
moning the fami ly physician ,  to send for an apothecary. I t  i s  the 
apothecary who suggests that Mrs . Reed send Jane away to 
school . 
Mrs . Reed decides to send Jane to the Lowood I nstitution , a 
bleak charitable  school for girl s harshly run by the miserly and 
hypocri tical Mr. Brocklehurs t .  Meeting Jane for the first t ime , 
Brocklehurs t ,  whom Bronte described with vivid phall ic imag-
1 6' !d. at 1 2 .  
166 See generally M ICHAE L fOUCAUL T.  MADN ESS AN D CIVIL IZATION : A HISTORY OF 
I NSANITY IN TH E AGE OF REASON ( 1 965)  (exploring the relations among confinement and 
attributions of insanity, unreason ,  and criminality in 1 6th- through 1 8t h-century Europe ) .  
Jane ' s  unders tanding of the importance of l iving e n  regie i s  reflected i n  the words of 
Phi l ippe Pine l :  "How necessary it  i s ,  in order to forestall hypochondria, melanchol ia ,  or 
mania . to fol low the immutable laws of moral i ty '"  !d. at 1 97 .  
1 67 B RONTE , supra note 4 ,  at 1 5 . 
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ery, 1 68 quickly concludes that Jane is  wicked . He promises Mrs . 
Reed that he wi l l  prepare Jane for an impecunious l ife of Christian 
service .  Delighted to escape her condition of " slavery" at Gates­
head , Jane finds courage in  the aftermath of M r. Brocklehurs t ' s  
visit to  speak her  mind  and stand her  ground against her aunt .  
Jane ' s  pre-admiss ion interview at  Gateshead with Brockle­
hurs t ,  the "black pi l lar" of Lowood Institution , 1 69 s ignals that her 
bad reputation within Gateshead will  fol low her beyond its bound­
aries .  Brocklehurst ful ly  accepts Mrs .  Reed ' s  testimony that Jane 
is deceitfu l .  When Jane te l ls  him she does not enjoy reading 
Psalms and that to avoid the wages of sin she will keep in good 
health to evade deat h ,  B rockelhurst construes her unorthodox 
replies as a shocking display of a s inful di sposition .  He i s ,  how­
ever, more confident that he will make Jane good than that she 
wil l  obstruct the miss ion of h is  gloomy school .  
Once it i s  p lain t o  Jane t hat M rs .  Reed wi l l  send her to Lowood , 
she fee ls  a modicum of freedom from Gates head' s l aw .  Fol lowing 
her summons into the parlor to meet with B rocklehurs t ,  Jane 
remains  behind after h i s  departure to wage a holy war for justice 
against her astonished Aunt. Overwhelmed by the child , losing 
their war of word s ,  M rs .  Reed surrenders and flees . Jane is 
"winner of the fie ld .  " 1 70 She fee ls  her bonds burst .  Thereafter, 
Bessie ' s  k i sses ,  hugs , sweets ,  and songs can warm Jane despite 
her "habitual mood of humil iation ,  self-doubt , [and] forlorn 
depression . " 1 7 1 "Even for me , "  Jane recal l s ,  " life had its gleams 
of sunshine . " 1 72 
Jane ' s  l ife at Gateshead comes to a close as she acquires an 
increased sense of freedom . Her victory over Mrs . Reed indicates 
that she can achieve a kind of l iberty among women .  After this 
encounter, female authority never again deeply vexes Jane . In­
spiring fear in  her adoptive mother, she achieves self-sovereignty, 
autonomy, in the world of women .  Jane is  later able to return to 
1 � H  See generally MoGLEN , supra note 3, at 1 1 2 .  ("The extraord inary phall ic imagery 
makes of B rocklehurst a symbol of male sexuality and associates that sexuality with 
sadism and deat h . ") B ronte uses similar imagery in  her depiction of St .  John as "a 
prostrate column . "  B RONTE, supra note 4 ,  at  356 .  
1 69 BRONTE, supra note 4 ,  at 26.  
1 70 /d. at 3 2 .  
1 7 1 /d. at 1 3 .  
m /d. a t  34 .  
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Gateshead on her own terms as a competent adul t ,  knowing i t  i s  
her duty to  help Eliza and Georgiana lay their mother to rest .  By 
the  time of  her  return , Master John is  already dead of his  de­
baucheries , and Jane has no opportunity to learn to manage the 
masculine element in the family .  She has , however, l earned to 
live as an equal among women . 
B.  Due Process : Lowood 
A few weeks after B rocklehurst ' s  visit to Gateshead and her 
victory over Mrs . Reed , Jane goes away to Lowood Institution .  
By the  time Jane leaves  Gateshead , she  believes that what i s  just  
and unjust ,  right and wrong , i s  not neces saril y  what household 
authorit ies assert it  to  b e .  This simple lesson is  a small  one , but 
large enough and inevitable enough for a child of ten . At  Gates­
head , the positive morali ty of household authorit ies (bac ked by 
positive l egal authorit ies)  contradicted Jane ' s  ideal of j ustice .  At 
Lowood , the authori t ies  of yet another social institution ,  the 
school , clash with Jane ' s  developing ideal s .  
Lowood i s  where Jan e  acquires the social and intellectual ski l ls  
that enabie her to negotiate the adult  world . Jane ' s  account of 
her experiences at Gateshead reveal s that she was a passionate 
child with a mind of her  own . S he possesses a s trong sense of 
inj ustice , expressed through the word s ,  metaphors , and h istorical 
al lus ions available to an uneducated young intel lect .  However, 
Jane ' s  mind was not yet discipl ined .  Jane ' s  sense of injustice was 
unclearly rooted in  ei ther ins t inc t ,  experience ,  reason , or secular 
and C hristian training . Jane had no clear understanding of the 
appropriate response to injustice in  the world . At  Lowood Jane 
learns self-discipl ine and respect for the value of due proces s .  
Lowood i s  a charity boarding school for girl s .  I ni tial ly,  the 
reality of Lowood ' s  supposed charity is cruelty and heart less  
negiect .  When Jane arrives at  school , the conditions are hars h .  
Food is  scarce , the educational regime severe . Again Jane is  cold 
and forced to exercise out of doors in  bad weather, only Lowood 
Jacks the compensating luxuries  of Gateshead . Although Brock­
lehurst spoils his own daughters , he preaches that meager com­
forts and vanities ,  even such comfort as heat and such vanity as 
naturaliy  curiy hair, compromise the virtue of Lowood girl s .  
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Jane arrives at Lowood eager for respect and friendship , but  
Brocklehurst turns her accidental breakage of a writing slate into 
an occasion for a publ ic trial . He condemns Jane in  front of the 
entire school as ungratefu l , a l iar, and someone to be shunned . 
Brocklehurst ' s  style of justice i s  l ike John Reed ' s .  I t  i s  uni lateral , 
swift, arbitrary, and without appeal . It is might behind a thin 
veneer of presumed moral , legal , and divine right .  
Jane fee ls  victimized by what she believes i s  the injustice of 
Brocklehurst ' s  s landerous punishment . However, Jane quickly 
discovers that she i s  not the only victim of such inj ustice . When 
Jane befriends Helen B urns and the young teacher, Miss Temple , 
she closely observes  how these two women cope with inj ustice 
at Lowood.  
Helen B urns pat ient ly and passively accepts inj ustice . She 
readi ly embraces others ' characterizations of her faults and culp­
abi l ity. When a teacher unfairly punishes Helen for being s lat­
ternly, Jane te l ls  Helen that she would rebel against  such treat­
ment.  "I must resist  those who punish me unjust ly ," 1 73 Jane 
explains . The "singularly deep impression [Miss Scatcherd ' s] in­
justice seems to have made on [Jane ' s ] heart , "  confounds Helen 
on whose fee lings "no i ll -u sage so brands its record . " 1 74 Helen 
attempts to teach Jane self-esteem and self- love through humil ity ,  
by urging her to quel l  her rebel l ious impul ses . Later, in  one of 
the nove l ' s  most poignant scenes ,  Helen and Jane fal l  asleep in 
the same bed . While the t iny rebel ri ses to see another day, the 
pale , pas sive beauty expire s .  1 75 Helen ' s  death from tuberculosis 
points Bronte ' s  audience toward the conclusion that Helen ' s  rec­
ommendation of uncritical , passive acceptance of the normative 
judgments of others is not an adequate coping mechanism for a 
young woman bent on l i ving to maturity. 
The soothing example of Miss  Temple ' s  marble  facade is  more 
influential with Jane than Helen Burn ' s  philosophy of acquies­
cence . Miss Temple symbolizes the value of formal , rational legal 
process .  I n  Miss  Temple ' s  hand s ,  Jane learns principles of ad­
ministrat ive and jud icial procedure . After cursory trial and judg­
ment by B rocklehurs t ,  Jane receives a hearing and appeal in Miss  
Temple ' s  chambers : 
1 7 3  !d. at 50.  
1 7 4  !d. 
175 !d. at 7 1 -72 .  
2 14 Harvard Women ' s  Law Journal [Vo l .  1 5  
Well ,  now, Jane , you know, or at least I wi l l  te l l  you , that 
when a criminal i s  accused , he i s  always allowed to speak 
in  his own defence . You have been charged with fal sehood ; 
defend yourself to me as wel l  as you can . 1 76 
Jane tempers her pas s ion,  subdues her resentment ,  and speaks 
calmly and convincingly to Miss  Temple .  Her cal m  recitation of 
the facts pave the way for her vindication :  Jane ' s  story of the 
Red Room is confirmed by the apothecary, Mr. Lloyd, whom 
Miss Temple happens to know and to whom she writes on Jane ' s  
behalf request ing information .  Jane i s  publicly cleared . 
Miss Temple also functions as Jane ' s  symbol of the possibi l i ty 
of equity within law. Temple ' s  quiet ,  rational defiance of the le tter 
of Brockleh urs t ' s  pol icy-making authority suggests that a woman 
can alleviate suffering and injustice without wholesale rej ection 
of establi shed norm s .  B rocklehurst has instructed that Lowood 
girls are to breakfast each day on porridge . When the cooks 
inadvertently burn the famished pupi l s '  ration of porridge one 
morning, Miss Temple decides that the girl s must  have something 
else to eat . Despite knowing B rocklehurst ' s "porridge rule" and 
his formali stic , uncaring tendencie s ,  Temple orders a special meal 
of cheese and crackers . S he refuses to interpret his porridge rule  
as  a "burned-porridge rule . "  She interprets the  porridge rule in­
stead as a "porridge-or-if-burned-an-alternative-modest-meal 
rule . "  When Brocklehurst discovers her "innovation,  " 1 77 Temple 
takes immediate responsibi l i ty for acting without his express  au­
thority .  She stands firm in her judgment when Brocklehurst 
launches into a pro forma sermon about feeding the body at the 
expense of the soul . Temple ' s  purposive interpretation of 
Brocklehurst ' s  law is so reasonable that Brocklehurst can muster 
no meaningful counterargument .  His attempt to trump Temple ' s  
reasoning with nominal ly rel igious pap makes h im look ridicu­
lous .  B rocklehurst refrains  from using his  considerable power to 
punish or counteract Miss  Temple ' s  judgment,  thereby implicit ly 
conceding her good sense . 
Jane abstracts  important features of her phi losophy of how to 
l ive responsibly within a system of rules from her observations 
1 70 !d. at 6 1-62 . 
1 77 !d. at 54 .  
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of Miss  Temple . Accepting a system of rules entai l s  accepting a 
certain number of, as i t  were , porridge rules ,  that i s ,  rules that 
sati sfy basic needs but not every desire . However, others , even 
one ' s  superiors , may harmful ly  interpret porridge rules  as burned­
porridge ru les .  One should not al low burned-porridge interpre­
tations of porridge rules to prevail . One can rat ional ly  and calmly 
defend the rejection of burned-porridge interpretations .  Rea­
soned , calm defiance can do more good in the long run than 
emotional outbursts of rebellion .  
Through Miss  Temple ' s  effort s Jane is  freed from the burden 
of a bad reputation and sets out to earn a good one : "I from that 
hour set to work afresh ,  resolved to pioneer my way through 
every difficulty :  I toi led hard , and my success was proportionate 
to my effort s  . . . .  " 1 78 Jane ' s  success matches her efforts in part 
because , as she discovers , she i s  not in  fact a s lave and because 
the material conditions  at Lowood dramatical ly  improve . After 
an epidemic of typhus ki l ls  many of Lowood ' s  pupi l s ,  public 
outcry leads to better conditions .  Wealthy  and benevolent sub­
scribers bui ld a new school . Most of Brocklehurs t ' s  authori ty  i s  
transferred to men "of rather more enlarged and sympathizing 
minds . . .  who [know] how to combine reason with strictnes s ,  
comfort with economy, compassion with uprightness . " 1 79 Jane 
flourishes in all the studies deemed appropriate to teach young 
women of her station , especial l y  drawing and foreign languages .  
Under the influence of Miss  Temple ,  Jane develops an orderly ,  
dutiful bearing and becomes a teacher at  the school . But when 
her dear teacher and friend leaves Lowood , Jane is  without in­
spiration for a regime of tranquil ity.  She begins to fee l  rest less 
and passionate again .  Jane longs for l iberty, for varied associates 
and experience . She sett les , however, for the stimulation of "at 
least a new servitude . " 1 80 Jane advertises for a post and accepts 
an offer to be governess  at Thornfield . Being a governess in a 
private household nearer to London promises greater st imulation 
than l ife at Lowood affords .  Jane surmises that the position wil l  
give her, at twice the pay, a life that i s  "respectab le ,  proper, en 
regfe . " 1 8 1 Jane ' s  craving for stimulation is  constrained by her 
1 7" !d. at  65 . 
1 7" !d. at 7 2 .  
I XU fLf. at 74 .  
' " 1  /d. at 77 . 
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expres sed desire to lead a life i n  keeping with moral and positive 
law. 
C. The Utility of Law: Thornfield 
1 .  The Fettered Gender 
Thornfield i s  the third stop on Jane ' s  journey toward autono­
mous acceptance of nomic constraint . She arrives with a degree 
of self-knowledge , but  with l i tt le knowledge of Thornfield ' s  true 
character. She mistakenly bel ieves Thornfield belongs to a 
proper, e lderly woman named Mrs . Fairfax . In fact ,  Mrs . Fairfax 
is on ly the housekeeper and distant relation of Edward Rochester, 
the true owner of the estate . When Jane learns of Rochester 's  
existence , she has no  idea that he i s  a sardonic , ugly man of forty 
with an immoral past . She does not know that her pupi l ,  Adele ,  
i s  her  employer ' s  i l legit imate daughter by  a French actre s s .  And 
although all of the servants know it , no one warns Jane that 
Thornfield i s  also home to a mad woman l iving in the attic . 1 �2 
Unti l  Rochester ' s  arrival on the scene , Thornfield is as dul l  for 
Jane as Lowood had become .  Adele , Mrs . Fairfax , the nurse , 
and the servants are decent people , but they are neither intel lec­
tual ly  nor emotional ly st imulating companions for Jane . The s lav­
ery rhetoric so characteris tic of Jane ' s  account of Gateshead 
recurs in her accounts of Lowood without Miss Temple and 
Thornfield without Rochester. 
As a chi ld ,  Jane seemed to think of herself as a l iteral s lave . 
As an adult  drawn back again and again to the metaphor of 
s lavery, Jane real izes that she i s  not actually a s lave under Engl ish 
law. Although her lover once refers to her work as "governessing 
slavery, " 1 83 Jane ' s  posit ion as a wage laborer is not s lavery and 
indeed contains  "privileges of security and ease . " 1 84 However, 
she is becoming " incapable  of appreciating" these privi leges and 
1�2 Only one servant , Grace Poole .  and a local surgeon, Carter. know that this  mad 
woman is also Edward Rochester ' s  wife . !d. at 272 . 
l o J  !d. at 238 .  
1�4 !d. at 1 02 .  
-
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refers to "the viewless fetters of a n  uniform and too st i l l  exis­
tence . " 1 85 Jane grows to appreciate that her fetters are her gender: 
[W]omen feel  just as men fee l ; . . .  they suffer from too rigid 
a constraint ,  too absolute a stagnation , precisely as men 
would suffer . . . .  I t  i s  thought less to condemn them, or 
laugh at them, if they seek to do more or learn more than 
custom has pronounced necessary for their sex . 1 86 
Men with natures as "re st less" 1 87 as hers would have been per­
mitted to seek "action .  " 1 88 They would have had the powers of 
vision to "reach the busy  world ,  towns , regions ful l  of l ife [Jane] 
had heard of but never seen . " 1 89 They would have had access to 
"more of practical e xperience" and "acquaintance with variety 
of character. " ' 90 
Jane ' s  recognition of gender inequity pits her ideals of j ustice 
against the posit ive morality and positive law of the wider culture .  
Her earl iest  nomic clashes were with particular individuals ,  i n  
the private realms o f  household and charity schoo l ,  whose au­
thority over her was permitted by remote positive l egal authority 
in  the public realm .  Previously, Jane had focussed on the evi l  
acts of Mrs . Reed, Master John Reed and Brocklehurst . In the 
later stages of her l ife at Lowood and the early stages of her l ife 
at Thornfiel d ,  the nineteen-year-old teacher' s nomic c lash  i s  with 
the whole patriarchic structure of the society into which she was 
born and which she does not expect to change . 
Jane inwardly complains  of the tedium of her female roles unti l  
she i s  excited by her first encounter with Edward Rochester. In 
him she finds the st imulation she craves .  One night walk ing alone 
near Thornfield she start les  a horse ridden by a man fol lowed by 
a dog. The man , who turns out to  be Rochester, i s  thrown from 
the horse and slightly inj ured . The relationship between Jane and 
Rochester grows fro m  reluctant to passionate . They fal l  in  love , 
but do not i mmediate ly  confess  it , i n  part because of the differ-
1 85 !d. 
1 86 !d. at 96 . 
1 87 !d. at 95 .  
1 88 !d. at 96 . 
1 89 !d. at 95 .  
190 !d. 
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ences in  their ages and stations ,  and in  part because Rochester 
i s  virtually engaged to the beautiful , aristocratic fortune hunter, 
Blanche I ngram . 
Before Rochester can throw over B lanche and announce h is  
love , Jane is called away to Mrs . Reed ' s  deathbed . To clear her  
conscience in  preparation for meeting her  maker, Mrs .  Reed 
bitterly reveals that Jane ' s  paternal uncle had come in  search of 
her some time before . This  revelation is  the first indication in  the 
novel that Jane may have a family from whom she could inherit 
financial independence .  Jane is  polite and useful to her fai l ing 
aunt and surviving cous ins . Master John Reed i s  already dead . 
Georgiana wallows in  selfish vanities .  Eliza, ignoring Jane as she 
had always done , retreats into a passionless ,  solitary religiosity .  
After Mrs . Reed dies and Jane has helped her cousins settle their 
affairs , she returns to Thornfie ld .  
Upon her  return , Jane and Rochester confess mutual love and 
decide to marry. Two things are striking about their betrothal . 
Firs t ,  l ike her platonic relationship with Miss Temple , Jane ' s  
romantic involvement with Rochester relieves her restlessnes s .  
Temple quieted Jane ' s  restlessness by  providing a model o f  calm ,  
Rochester by providing the  stimulation Jane craves .  Jane ' s  re­
sponse to the companionship of Rochester and Temple suggests 
that she i s  not primari ly  troubled by the l imitation of female roles  
as  such . Jane is more troubled by the  helplessness a woman can 
feel when she can do nothing within the confines of cas a ,  chiesa , 
scuola to heighten her chances of finding happiness through 
friendship and romantic love . 
Second , Jane does not press  Rochester for a satisfactory ac­
count of the mysterious violence at Thornfield .  Someone nearly 
burns  Rochester to death in  his bed ; someone inflicts a bloody 
chest wound on the uninvited v is i tor whom we later learn i s  
Rochester ' s  brother-in-law, M r. Mason ; someone rips  Jane ' s  
wedding veil i n  two o n  the eve of the i l l -fated wedding. Yet Jane 
al lows Rochester and his trusted servants their secrets . 1 9 1  
1 9 1  Such secrecy cou ld be interpreted as oppress ive control by Rochester as master of 
the manor. However, comp are th i s  wi th the  Rivers ' al lowing "Jane El l iot" to keep secret 
her ident i ty as "Jane Eyre" when they took her in at Moor House.  Openness was not a 
precondit ion of love . respect and friendship i n  the nove l .  See i nfra notes 223-224 and 
accompanying text . 
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2 .  Philosophical Cris i s  
a .  Church and Sta te 
Rochester' s secrets are revealed to Jane by Mr. Briggs , a Lon­
don attorney, and by Mr. Mason . Some months earl ier Mason 
had been Thornfield ' s  uninvited guest , hurried away under cover 
of night by a cooperative local surgeon after receiving the chest 
wound Jane had helped to nurse . At the time , Jane suspected 
that the seamstress ,  Grace Poole , was the assailant . In fact ,  
Bertha ,  Mr. Mason ' s  sister and Rochester' s legal wife ,  had in­
flicted the wound.  
A ware of the pending marriage through Jane ' s correspondence , 
Jane ' s  uncle sends attorney B riggs , accompanied by Mason , to 
prevent Rochester ' s  bigamous  union with Jane . At the marriage 
altar, posit ive civi l  law, represented by Briggs , confronts eccle­
siastical divine law, represented by Reverend Wood . Briggs con­
fident ly  enters the house of God and cal l s  its proceedings to a 
hal t .  Positive civi l  law asserts  not so much its dominance over 
ecclesiastical law, but their unity. The proposed marriage i s  not 
acceptable in either realm .  
Briggs arrives with " a  paper" in  h i s  pocket and speaks to 
Rochester through the nose rather than the soul : 
"My name is  Briggs-a sol icitor . . . .  "
"And you would thrust on me a wife ?" 
"I would remind you of your lady ' s  existence , s i r ;  which 
the law recognise s ,  if you do not . "  
. . .  M r. Briggs calmly took a paper from his  pocket , and 
read out in a sort of official , nasal voice . . . .  1 92 
Jane ' s  characterization of Briggs as nasal suggests that lawyers 
triv ialize matters of importance ; that lawyers value procedure 
more than substance , confident in their power to coerce through 
legal formality. However, Jane later admits respect for the posi­
tive law, if not for i ts  messengers . 
1"' B RONTE. supra note 4 .  at 255 .  
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By contrast , Rochester i s  indifferent to any law but  h i s  own . 
He demands that Reverend Wood ignore Briggs and continue the 
wedding . Wood refuses . ins isting that the wedding not "proceed 
without some investigat ion into what has been asserted , and 
evidence of its truth or fal sehood .  " 1 93 Rochester inte rprets 
Wood ' s  refusal as the subordination of divine to civi l  authority. 
Yet Wood is  s imply acknowledging the virtual unity of the civi l  
and ecclesiastical laws of marriage presupposed by the wedding 
ceremony:  
[ I ]f either of you know any impediment why ye  may not 
lawful ly  be joined together in  matrimony, ye do now confess  
it ; for . . .  so  many as  are coupled together otherwise than 
God ' s  word doth al low, are not joined together by  God , 
neither i s  their matrimony lawful . 1 94 
Briggs may presume the superiority of "paper" human authority, 
but Wood ' s  cooperation is  consistent with the premise of church 
superiority.  Rel igion (church or divine law) and positive law stand 
united against Rochester ' s personal morality. 
His plan to marry Jane thwarted ,  Rochester escorts Jane , the 
lawyer, and the mini ster from the church to an upper chamber of 
Thornfield to introduce his  insane wife .  Rochester chal lenges the 
wedding party to j udge him badly for seeking a meaningful mar­
riage : " [J]udge me , priest of the gospel and man of the law, and 
remember, with w hat judgment ye judge ye shal l  be j udged .  " 1 95 
Yet , under the laws  of humanity and of God , Briggs and Wood 
can easily judge Rochester harshly .  I n  attempting to marry Jane , 
he was attempting to do what he had no righ t  to do , for his 
unfortunate marriage to Bertha is  as val id as any. 
The novel assumes what legal his torians know. The eccles ias­
tical and civi l  law of mid-century England did not permit Roch­
ester to divorce B ertha simply because she had become insane . 
The legal consequence i s  c lear:  " [D]eprivations of reason . . .  
[are] not a cause of divorce , if they happened after marriage 
'".1 !d. at 254. 
' "�  !d. 
'"' !d. at 258-59.  
1 992] The Juri sprudence of Jane Eyre 22 1 
• • • • " 196 Bertha' s fami ly had a h istory of insanity.  Rochester ' s  
father and brother knew about th is  h istory when they encouraged 
the financial l y  advantageous match . B ut Bertha was not i nsane 
when Rochester married her. Rochester cannot premise divorce 
on the ground of Bertha' s insanity ; nor can he premise divorce 
on the crue l ty of her insane attempts to murder h im .  His  only 
remedy i s  to continue to do as he had done since bringing Bertha 
to Thornfield :  he can employ physical restraint : " [Mere cruelty 
is  perhap s a cause for d ivorce ] ; but madness , dementia, posit ive 
disease of the mind ,  th is  is quite another matter. An insane man 
is l ikely enough to be dangerous to his  wife ' s  personal safety, but 
the remedy l ies  in  the restraint of the husband , not the release of 
the wife . " 1 97 B ecause Rochester ' s  marriage to Jane is  a civil and 
rel igious impossibi l i ty,  the couple i s  l eft to consider an all iance 
other than an official marriage . 
b .  Rules , Reason and Freedom 
Rochester proposes cohabitat ion .  Jane refuses . But why? Why 
does Jane refuse  Rochester' s proposal that she l ive with h im in 
affluent comfort at Thornfield or i n  France as his  mis tress ?  Be­
coming a mistress  was not a widely approved choice for a well­
bred Englishwoman , of course . But so what? What is approved 
by some may not be what i s  right .  Life at Lowood and Gateshead 
had already demonstrated that social el i tes sometimes pervert 
morality.  Moreover, accepting Rochester ' s  proposal for cohabi-
I % JOHN BRYDALL .  NON COMPOS MENTIS OR. THE LAW R EL ATING TO NATURAL 
FooLs, MAD-FOLKS . A N D  LUNA TICK PERSONS,  INQUIFITED ,  AND ExPLAINED FOR CoM­
MON B EN EFIT 1 1 2 (Garland Publi sh ing Co. 1 979) ( 1 700). See also WILLIAM G . H .  CooK,  
INSANITY A N D  MENTAL DEFICIENCY I N  R ELATION TO LEGAL R ESPONS IB IL ITY: A STUDY 
IN  PSYCHOLOGICAL J URISPRUDENCE 1 1 8 ( 1 92 1 )  ("Where marriage has  once  been val idly 
contracted , the usual incidents belonging to it  attach and continue notwithstanding the 
subsequent i nsanity of either part y :  that is to say,  supervening insanity of itself will not 
operate as a dissolution of the bond , nor afford a ground for a decree of d issolution of 
the marriage , or of j ud icial separation . . . .  ") . 
197 Hall v. H al l ,  3 SW. & TR . 347, 349 ( 1 864) (denying wife ' s  petit ion for d issolution of 
marriage by reason of cruelty and adultery) .  Cf. White v. White,  I SW. & TR. 59 1 ( 1 859) 
(granting hu sband' s  pet i t ion for a decree of separation on the grounds that he  was in 
danger of assault from his wife who attacks when she either d rinks too much spirits or 
suffers a temporary bout of insanity ) ;  Hayward v. Hayward , I SW. & TR. 8 1  ( 1 858) 
(husband may not use wife ' s  i nsanity as a defense to her claim for rest i tution of cor.jugal 
right s ,  "A husband is not ent i t led to turn a lunatic wife out of doors . He may rather be 
bound to place her in  proper custody, under proper care , but he i s  not entit led to turn 
her out of h i s  house . " ) .  
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tation promises Jane the things she longs for :  reciprocal love , 
material comfort , new people , foreign places . Refus ing Rochester 
means returning to the lonely drudgery of wage labor. 
Rochester' s  proposal tempts Jane . But she rejects i t  for reasons 
of prudence and principle .  Jane keenly desires  avoiding becoming 
the latest in  Rochester ' s  long l ine of despised mistresses . Roch­
ester  considers " [h ] i ring a mistress . . .  the next worse thing to 
buying a s lave . " 1 98 He views mistresses ,  l ike s laves ,  as "often by 
nature and always b y  position inferior. " 1 99 Knowing the special 
pain of fee ling l ike a s lave ,  Jane does not want to risk seeming 
like one in her lover ' s eyes .  Jane also desires  to adhere to general 
principles that wi l l  further her ends . She believes that the laws 
of marriage have a legitimate purpose , "given by God ; sanctioned 
by man . "200 Like Austin , 20 1 Jane seems to regard the principle of 
util ity as an index of God ' s  l aw. However, the uti l ity foremost in 
Jane ' s  mind is  her own personal happines s ,  rather than the ag­
gregate social happiness  that Austin ,  Bentham , and Mi l l  held up 
as the ideal goal of the law. 
The conversation between Jane and Rochester after the can­
cel lation of their wedding amounts to a debate about competing 
philosophies of law. I t  is not their first such debate . A discussion 
occurring on their third encounter, the abstraction of which had 
made Jane fee l  ignorant ,  202 reflected differences in their attitudes 
about rules  and the rule of law. There , Rochester had announced 
that he was the source of the only normative constraints of any 
significance to him:  "I know what my aim is , and what my mo­
tives are ; and at this  moment I pass a law, unalterable as t hat of 
the Medes and Persian s ,  that both are right . "203 Rochester i s  
prepared to  believe that "unheard-of combinations of  circum­
stances demand unheard-of rules .  "204 Jane ' s  response shows that 
she is  autonomous i n  her j udgment , but a conservative who be­
l ieves in the virtual unity of divine , civil , and moral law. She 
19x B RONTE , supra note 4 ,  at 274. 
1 99 !d. 
�0  !d. at 279. 
20 1 I AusTI N ,  supra note 1 0 .  at 1 1 0 .  
202 B RONTE , supra note 4 ,  at 1 20-2 1 ( 'To speak truth , sir. I don ' t  u nderstand you at  
a l l :  I cannot keep up  the  co nversation , because i t  has got  out  of my depth . "' ) .  
20' I d. at 12 I .  
20� !d. 
-
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believes that right principles are by and large already embodied 
in  the establ ished famil iar rule s .  Rochester' s resolutions cannot 
be right " if they require a new statute to legalise them . "205 Human 
individuals are fal l ible and " should not arrogate a power with 
which the divine and perfect alone can be safely entrusted .  "206 
Rochester hopes Jane wi l l  abandon principle in  the face of 
suffering . Rochester ' s  imperative to avoid suffering carrie s  
weight with the former suffering inmate of Gateshead and 
Lowood . Jane provisional l y  embraces  the argument against for­
mal istic adherence to anti-bigamy and anti-adultery stricture s .  
However, s h e  quickly di scerns t h e  fal sity of Rochester' s premise 
that breaching these strictures would be harmless . Rochester 
overlooks that she would suffer in  the breach . Jane maintains  her 
earlier e xpressed belief t hat her only chance for freedom is 
through l iving "en n?gle . "207 
Jane ' s  characterization of Rochester' s maxim of ad hoc law­
making as "dangerous" reflects her sympathy for Austi n ' s  uti l i­
tarian conception of the role of rule s ,  principl es and maxims m 
governing human conduct : 208 
Speaking generall y, human conduct , including the human 
conduct which is  subject  to divine commands ,  is inevitably 
guided by rules ,  or by  principles or maxims . 
If  our experience and observation of particulars were not 
generalized, our experience and observation of particulars 
would seldom avail us in practice .  To review on the spur of 
the occasion a host  of particulars , and to obtain from those 
part icu lars a conclus ion appl icable to the case , were a pro­
cess too slow and uncertain to meet the exigencies of our 
l ive s .  The inferences suggested to our minds by repeated 
experience and observation are , therefore , drawn into prin­
ciples , or compressed into maxims . 209 
'"-' !d. 
'"" /d. 
'"7 /d. at 7 7 .  
'"� Jane describes Rochester's maxim as "dangerous" because it  i s  " l iable to abuse ."  
/d. a t  1 2 1 .  I nterestingly, Aust in  considers and rejects the  objection that ut i l i tarianism is 
subject to abuse and warping b y  selfishness and evi l .  I AusT IN ,  supra note 1 0 ,  at 1 1 2-
1 3 .  He later concedes the charge for the sake of argument and defends uti l i tarianism 
against  c harges t hat it is "dangerous" by arguing in  favor of a k ind of rule ut i l itarian ism.  
He does bel ieve that  act  by act assessment would be inconvenient .  See id. at  1 1 3- 1 4 .  
'"� I A USTI N ,  supro note 1 0 ,  a t  1 1 5 ( e mphasis in original ) .  
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To abandon such maxims as though one could view each situation 
wholl y  and successfu l ly  on its own terms is  to deny one ' s  human 
fal l ibi l i ty and to pretend to the power or vision of a god . 
Jane ' s  analysis  does not end with her rejoinder to Rochester ' s  
argument that she ought do  what would cause him t he  least pain . 
Jane i s  drawn to hard-headed uti li tarian thinking too . She and 
Rochester both seek their own happiness .  2 1 0  They are , in a non­
pejorative sense of the term , hedonists . B ut Rochester subscribes 
to the "act" form of hedonistic uti l i tarianism , Jane to the "ru le .  "2 1 1 
Like Austi n ,  Jane argue s  that laws and principles  that have ra­
tional appeal before hardship and disappointment set in , for ex­
ample , before we di scover that our wives are insane and before 
we are driven nearly i nsane ourselves by the prospect of loss ,  
are the tru ly  binding ones we ought to fol low. I n  words reminis­
cent of Austin ' s ,  Jane e xplains  to Rochester that :  
"Laws and principles are not for the times when there i s  no 
temptation : they are for such moments as thi s ,  when body 
and soul ri se in  mutiny against their rigor ;  stringent are they ;  
inviolate they shal l  be . I f  a t  my  individual convenience I 
might break them , what would be their worth?  They have a 
worth-so I have always believed ; and if I cannot believe it 
now, i t  i s  because I am insane-quite insane . . . .  "2 1 2 
I t  i s  important to note t hat Jane is  not abrogating the responsi­
bi l i ty of judgment whol ly  to others . S he is  not just  saying t hat 
the rules  are rules  and everyone should fol low them . Her words 
are that "I have always be l ieved" that laws and principles "have 
a worth . "2 1 3  Their worth is that they protect us  from pain and 
2 1 0 Uti l itarians general l y  advocated conduct or rules that maximize the happiness. p lea­
sure or well-being of the greatest number. See,  e .g . , id. at 1 1 0 .  Neither Jane ' s  nor 
Rochester' s consequential i sm is sufficient ly other-directed to qual ify as c lassical ut i l i tar­
ian ism.  I use the term "hedonistic ut i l itarian" below to describe a moral point of view 
which aims at maximizing the ind ividual moral agent 's  own good.  
2 1 1  Roughly ,  act  ut i l i tarianism requires  that one perform the act  which , of the possible 
alternative s .  would bring about the most happiness.  Rule ut i l itarianism requires that one 
perform the act which comports with the best set of rules to govern action ,  i . e . ,  those 
rules the universal adoption of which would maximize happiness.  See J . J  .C. SMART & 
B ERNARD WILLIAMS ,  UTIL ITARIANISM :  fOR AND AGAINST 9- 1 2  ( 1 973 ) .  
2 1 2  B RONTE, supra note 4,  at 279 . But cf. Mil ton R .  Konvitz,  Utilitarian Justice: Tech­
nical and Discretionary ,  40 PHIL .  REv . 69 ( 1 93 1 )  (arguing that the ut i li tarian goal of the 
greatest justice for the greatest number may best be achieved by not adhering to general 
rules in exceptional cases) . 
2n B RONTE , supra note 4 ,  at 279 . 
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evil  better than our passions can . On what Austin termed "the 
spur of the occasion , "  painfu l  appl ication of laws and principles 
can seem l ike evi l ,  hegemonic constraint . However, laws and 
principles he lp to make us safe and free .  2 1 4  
Jane respects conventionalit ies but  i s  not a mere toady to 
convention . This i s  apparent i n  her condemnation of those who 
mock women who try to "do more or learn more than custom 
has pronounced necessary for their sex .  "2 1 5  But she bel ieves her 
freedom and sanity require a l ife of respectabi l i ty .  She chose 
Thornfield ,  thinking i t  would be "a neat , orderly" home ;2 1 6 instead 
she discovers i t  i s  a home disordered by Bertha' s madness and 
Rochester ' s passions . Jane leaves Thornfield  and Rochester be­
cause she does not want to throw away everyth ing she has 
worked for, for the sake of satisfying either her irrational , mad 
passions or h i s .  Her rej ection of Rochester spares h im a second 
mad "wife" and her a second visit  to the Red Room. 
Jane never regrets  her decision to run away. Later, settled in  
her pleasant l ife as v i l lage school teacher, she i s  glad that she 
adhered to "princip le  and law, and scorned and crushed the in­
sane prompting of a frenzied moment . "2 1 7 Recognizing her actions 
as a product of sel f-sovereignty, she thanks God for directing her 
to her correct choice.  God ' s  direction spares her a l ife i n  France 
as a mistress-"a s lave  in  a fool ' s  paradise at Marsei l les-fevered 
with delusive b l i ss  one hour-suffocating with the bitterest tears 
of remorse and s hame the next . "2 18 Jane concludes that she i s  
better off as a "vi l lage schoolmistress ,  free and hones t ,  in  a 
breezy mountain nook in  the heal thy heart of England .  "2 1 9 Yet 
Jane is  lonely .  
Rochester knew from their conversation at their t hird meeting 
that Jane would d isapprove of efforts to reclai m  h is  l ife and 
character by making up new rules , or breaking old ones .  But  he 
does not respect th is  phi losophical difference . The equality 
� 1 4  But  cf. Lesl ie  Green ,  A uthority and Convention , PHIL .  Q .  329, 345 ( 1 985) (criticizing 
the conventional is t  who views laws "as useful counsels of prudence,  as wise bet s ,  on 
balance , and al l  thi ngs cons idered"). 
w B RONTE, supra note 4 .  at  96. 
2 1 6  /d. at 77. 
� 1 7  !d. at 3 1 6 . 
m id. 
�19 /d. at 279 . 
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Bronte ' s  heroine ascribes to her relationship with Rochester must 
be discounted by the di srespect he shows for her p hi losophic 
values and by the special arrogance of his monumental deception 
about his marriage to B ertha .  Rochester selfishly ignores Jane ' s  
principle s ,  preferring h i s  own " law. " When Jane finds h i m  out , 
he tries to persuade her  to "transgres s  a mere human law-no 
man being inj ured by the breac h , "  rather than "drive a fel low­
creature to despair. "22o 
Jane ' s  abil ity to forgiv e  Rochester ' s  deception so quickly can 
be read as a lover ' s  compassion for human moral frai l ty .  Poverty 
and gender forced Jane to develop the strength of character 
needed to check the excesses  of her own passion through auton­
omous submission to duty .  Now she is  able to show sympathy 
for others l ike Rochester who , though of fundamental ly  sound 
character, are less  successful than she at autonomous self-con­
straint . Rochester ' s  selfi shness  and deception are great , but Jane 
can appreciate that the past misfortunes that cloud his judgment 
were also great .  
Law i s  a definitive force i n  the society B ronte depict s .  The 
di sruption of Jane and Rochester ' s  wedding ceremony by the 
lawyer B riggs i l lustrates i ts  power. So, too, does Reverend 
Wood ' s  refusal to proceed with the wedding ceremony.  Yet ,  in a 
sense , neither the posit ive civi l  law nor the Christ ian Church 
have power over Rochester and Jane .  Rochester has the financial 
means to e scape the technicalit ies of marriage in  his search for 
companionship . Rochester' s problem is  not the Jaw, but Jane , h is  
t iny,  indomitable love . Jane can do as she pleases .  She is  not 
constrained by civi l  or church Jaw as such ,  but by her own better 
judgment about the firm ,  pragmatic value of each . 2 2 1  
D. Heaven Through Nature : Moor House and Morton Cottage 
Jane ' s  dead mother comes to her in a "trance-l ike dream" 
warning her to flee Thornfield ' s  temptation . 222 Knowing that she 
��0 !d. 
��� Peter B rooks characterizes Jane Eyre ' s  plot as a "female plot of ambition . " B ROOKS , 
supra note 32 ,  at 39 .  He defines female ambition as "the formation of an i nner drive 
toward the assertion of selfhood in  resistance to the overt and violating male plots of 
ambit ion,  a counter-dynamic which . . .  is on ly  superficial ly passive . "  !d. B rooks defines 
male ambition as being toward a more focussed , self-conscious , yet extrinsic goal . !d. 
Ambition may be the wrong concept to convey what drives the plot of Jane Eyre . 
"� B RONTE , supra note 4 ,  at 28 1 .  
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has breached her master' s perverted l aw, Jane flees223 and for a 
short time l ives as a beggar. On the brink of starvation ,  she i s  
taken in  at Moor House by two kind , intel l igent sisters , and their 
brother St .  John ,  a minister. This  sibl ing structure paralle ls  that 
of Gates head ; the paral le l  becomes even more obvious once it i s  
discovered that Jane i s  the Rivers ' cous in . 224 
Master John Reed i s  as selfish and physical a tormentor of 
Jane ' s  early l ife as St . John Rivers i s  a selfish and psychological 
tormentor of her later l ife .  John Reed uses his rudimentary un­
derstanding of posit ive civi l  law and moral law to justify his 
interference with Jane ' s  autonomy, much as St. John Rivers uses 
his imperial ist ic interpretation of divine law and posit ive moral 
Ia w to do the same . 
The Rivers help Jane recover and obtain a post as mistress of 
a vi l lage school at Morton . This  posit ion comes with a l itt le 
cottage house of her own . Jane l ives independently under the 
name of Jane E l liot . On a vis i t  to Jane ' s  cottage , St . John notices 
that she has s igned one of her drawings "Jane Eyre . "  He pieces 
together t he facts  to conclude that she is the missing heiress 
sought by his  fel low clergy and that she i s  his own cousin. Jane 
insi sts upon sharing her fortune with each of her cousins . Jane 
had long hated the posit ive law that dictated her poverty. She 
welcomes the use of l egal power to correct the law ' s  often harsh 
consequences .  Jane ' s  bel ief ( influenced by Miss  Temple) that 
positive law does not foreclose equity leads her to give each of 
her cousins five thousand of her twenty thousand pound inheri ­
tance . Her sense of j us tice and fami ly  fee ling demand i t :  " [l ] t  
would torment and oppress  me to have twenty thousand ; which ,  
moreover, could never be mine in  justice , t hough i t  might i n  
law. "225 St .  John can see  a certain justice i n  an  equal division of 
Jane ' s  legacy, but s t i l l  cautions her that it is "contrary to al l  
custom . "226 Before accepting Jane ' s  generosity, S t .  John reminds 
Jane of her legal right s :  
" [T]he entire fortune is  yours by  right :  m y  uncle gained i t  
b y  his  own effort s ;  he  was free t o  leave i t  t o  whom h e  would :  
223 " I had injured-wounded-left m y  master." !d. a t  283 . 
22" The coincidence that the fami ly  of s ib l ings on whose doorstep Jane happened to 
collapse were Jane 's  actual first cousins is a heavy-handed plot device.  So too i s  the 
exact paral le l ism of the fami ly  structure at Moor House and Gateshead . 
225 B RONTE , supra note 4 ,  at 340 . 
226 !d. at 34 ! .  
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he left it to you. After al l ,  justice permits you to keep i t :  
you may, with a clear conscience,  consider it absolutely your 
own . "227 
I t  is important to note that Jane does not believe she ought to 
refuse her inheritance altogether, or donate a portion of her 
wealth to poor friends or strangers . Jane ' s  "justice" keeps the 
fami l y ' s  wealth within the family.  Thi s  private generosity i s  wel l  
within the spirit of posit ive law. 
Jane ' s  joy among the Rivers deteriorates in the face of S t .  
John ' s  increas ing menace . St .  John  is  initial l y  prepared to  respect 
Jane and to love her from afar as a s ister. With time , however, 
he wants to marry Jane . The strong rhetoric of s lavery returns 
to the narrative as the learned cleric attempts to convince Jane 
that she is a woman "formed for labour, not for love . "228 Although 
Rosamond Oliver would gladly be his wife ,  Rosamond makes S t .  
John ' s  flesh  tremble with desire . S t .  John views Jane as  better 
sui ted to join him on his spiritual crusade .  He "prizes [her] as a 
soldier would a good weapon .  "229 S t .  John offers Jane no real 
affection .  The icy kisses  of the self-described Christian phi loso­
pher s ignify his  approval . They are "seal [s ]  affixed to [Jane ' s] 
fetters . "230 
Determined to train her for missionary work abroad , St .  John 
takes away Jane ' s  " l iberty of mind.  "23 1 He forces her to learn the 
"Hindostanee" language . In  a manner reminiscent of her habitual 
obedience to John Reed , Jane is at S t .  John ' s  beck and cal l : 
When he said "go , "  I went ; "come ,"  I came ; "do thi s , "  I did 
it .  But I did not love my "servitude . "232 
Jane tries to please St .  John because he has been kind to her, 
and because she bel ieves i n  the worth of his  work . But  the cost 
to her i s  dear : 
cc7 fd. 
ccx !d. at 354.  
" '�  !d. at 356.  
c J o  Jd . at 350-5 1 .  
c J I  Jd. at 3 50 .  
:.1c Jd. 
-
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I [feel]  dai ly  more and more that I must disown half my 
nature , s tifle half my facul ties ,  wrest my tastes from their 
original bent ,  force myself to the adoption of pursuits for 
which I [ have] no natural vocation .  �33 
By the time S t .  John reveals his plan and proposes to Jane , she 
feels  an "iron shroud" contract around her. 234 
St .  John offers Jane the inverse of Rochester' s offer. On ac­
count of love , Rochester wanted Jane to go abroad as his  mis­
tress . Without love , St .  John wants her to trave l  abroad as his 
wife .  Both offers lead Jane to fear virtual s lavery. Jane refuses  
Rochester because she fears unhappiness associated with  shame , 
the loss of self-respect , and eventual abandonment by  her lover. 
She wants to refuse S t .  John because she fears unhappiness  and 
the gradual loss of self. She resolves tentative ly  to go with him 
to Asia as a co-worker, but not as h i s  wife .  In that way : 
I should st i l l  have m y  unblighted self to turn to :  my natural 
unenslaved feel ings with which to communicate in moments 
of lonel ines s .  There would be recesses in  my mind which 
would be only mine . . . .  [A]s h is  wife-at his s ide always ,  
and always re strained ,  and always checked-forced to keep 
the fire of my nature continually  low, . . .  -thi s  would be 
unendurab le .  2 3 5  
Jane , who sometimes worries about her reputation ,  i s  reluctant 
to buy the argument that publ ic opinion makes travel ing with St .  
John other than as h is  wife impossible . Jane is wil l ing to sacrifice 
personal happiness to satisfy the divine will that she become a 
missionary. But  she i s  rel uctant to make a sacrifice greater than 
necessary merely for the sake of appearances .  
S t .  John persists in  presenting h i s  w i l l  as divine wil l , h i s  law 
as God ' s  law. I n  contrast to the relatively mundane religious 
authority of Rev . Wood , the learned and saint ly S t .  John repre­
sents the h ighest ,  most credible form of religious authority .  His  
reading of God ' s  wi l l  i s  mediated t hrough no human institution 
greater than himself. In Jane ' s  earl ier confrontations with Roch-
m !d.  at 35 1 .  
�34 !d. at 355 .  
' 3 '  !d. at 359.  
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ester, she had relied upon her own reason and e xperience to 
protect her from yie lding to the wi l l  of her pass ionate social 
superior. Reason and experience told her what she must do to 
avoid the unhappy s lavery of concubinage : obey the rul e s .  But 
in her final meeting with S t .  John ,  Jane ' s  reason is  nearly lost  to 
her. She is  nearly los t  to herself. Acting in  the name of God , S t .  
John wears down Jane ' s  abil ity for independent t hought and 
action . 
St . John stands ho lding Jane in h is  arms ,  l ike a bird in the 
hand,  awaiting words of submiss ion.  She is  dazzled and over­
whelmed . Desperate to find out whether divine law truly dictates  
marnage and missionary work , Jane makes a direct appeal to 
heaven : 
I sincerely ,  deep ly ,  fervently longed to do what was right ; 
and only that . "Show me ,  show me the path !"  I entreated 
of heaven.  236 
In that moment of pitched excitement Jane hears the voice of 
Edward Rochester cal l ing her name .  She cries back : "I am com­
ing ! . . .  Wait for me !"237 
The scene is perhaps the most curious in the novel .  Jane ' s  
repeated rational exchanges with S t .  John have c larified the is­
sue s .  In the batt le of the wi l l s ,  St . John has all but won . Then 
Jane side-steps S t .  John and asks heaven i tself for direction . She 
receives a response s he knows those who read her story wil l  
regard as impossible . Moreover, the path heaven reveals leads 
her to do something s he knows her readers wil l  regard as wrong : 
return to her presumably  married lover. Jane ' s  explanation for 
the impossible communication with Rochester i s  simple : 
[ I ] t  i s  the work of nature . She has roused , and did-no 
miracle-out her bes t .  238 
Breaking away from the c lutc hes of S t .  John ,  Jane successful ly  
commands the obedience from him that he had hitherto gotten 
from her :  
" "  !d. at 369. 
2 n  !d. 
c)H !d. at 369-70. 
1 992] The J u ri sprudence of Jane Eyre 23 1 
It was my time to assume ascendancy. My powers were in 
play, and in  force .  I told h im to forbear question or remark ; 
I desired him to l eave me :  I must , and would be alone . He 
obeyed at once .  Where there is energy to command well  
enough , obedience never fai l s .  239 
At that instant ,  with that di scovery, Jane becomes chief justice 
to the sovere ign law of her private l ife .  She speaks to St. John 
in the condescending language of M rs .  Reed . Hearing the voice 
of Rochester, breaking away from St. John ' s  clutches ,  Jane 
thanks God and hast i ly  advances to Thornfield .  
Jane hears Rochester ' s  voice i n  response to  a prayer. B ut why 
should his distant cries l ure her back to Thornfield when his face­
to-face p leas were not e nough to keep her from running away in 
the first place? Jane gives the impress ion that she simply knows 
that everything wi l l  be al l  right . She knows she can return without 
ri sk to her self and self-respect . Rochester ' s voice i s  a rel iable , 
but private , sign of what she ought to do . 240 In  returning to 
Rochester with nature ' s  special permis sion , she knows that what 
she is doing wi l l  not prove wrong-legally ,  morally ,  or other­
wise-and s he is righ t .  
Arguably ,  Jane reasonably could have decided to  return to 
Rochester without such a sign . Once she has concluded that she 
could l ive and work near St .  John without marrying him,  she 
eas i ly  could have concluded that i t  would be fine to l ive and work 
near Rochester, despite h is  marriage to Bertha. Later, when she 
finds Rochester at Ferndean Jane playful ly  warn s ,  " If you won ' t  
let me  l i ve  with you ,  I :an  bui ld a house of my own close up  to 
your door, and you may come and sit  in my parlor when you 
want company of an e vening .  " 24 1  However, she makes this  remark 
knowing Rochester has no wife .  And even sti l l , Jane the narrator 
worries that her readers might th ink that by offering freely to be 
Rochester ' s  neighbor and companion  she "rashly overleaped con­
ventional it ie s .  "242 So she reassures  us  that she made her proposal 
234 !d.  at 370.  
24° Cf R .  H OWA RD BLOC H .  M E D I EVAL FRENCH L I TE RATU RE A N D  LAW 19 ( 1 977) ( "The 
efficacy of the judicum Dei rests upon a belief in  the i mmanence of supernatural powers 
with in the natural sphere . " ) .  
2" 1 B RONTE,  supra note 4 ,  at 382 .  
2"2 hi. at 383 . 
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"from the idea that he wished and would ask me to be his wife . "243 
Apparent ly  Jane does not in fact think l iving near Rochester 
without marriage , simply because she loves him , would be the 
moral or psychological equivalent of l iving near St .  John , whom 
she does not love , to conduct mis sionary work . 
Jane returns to Thornfield at the "supernatural" sound of Roch­
ester' s voice because she reads the physical ly  impossible sound 
as a veridical , though private , sign to her from God and nature 
that returning would be safe . God and nature , faith  and sense , 
cooperate to inform her that no divine , moral , civi l , or  natural 
barriers block a reunion with her beloved . 244 Earlier in the novel 
Church and State cooperated to tel l  her that she ought not l ive 
as Rochester' s wife . Rochester had not heard the voice of her 
reason nor had he seen the ghost of her mother that caused Jane 
to flee Thornfield . Likewise ,  S t .  John does not hear the voice of 
Rochester. These are private signs ,  spoken only to Jane , symbols 
of the exercise of independent judgment about the demands of 
normative order. 
Jane ' s  wi l l ingness  to fol low what she believes heaven and na­
ture wi l l  is  an ult imate act of independence . The Reeds , 
B rocklehurst , Rochester, and St .  John understood the law to 
require that Jane submit to terms and conditions of social life 
that she herself regards as intolerable .  Jane takes on the el ite 
interpreters of nomic order and wins .  In  early chapters of the 
novel , she grapples with the interpreters of positive moral law, 
civil law, and ecclesiastical law. In  the final chapters she grapples 
with the interpreters of divine law and the physical law of nature . 
St .  John thinks he knows more about the natural and divine 
constraints on Jane ' s  l ife than she does .  He characterizes her as 
by nature a solid work horse without pas sion and without a need 
for love . Her psychological nature , she knows , is passionate . She 
would wither under h i s  re ins .  It had already begun to happen .  
Leaving h im  and having things work out for the best prove that 
she knows ( her) nature better than he .  She resists S t .  John ' s  
characterization of her  C hristian duty. Refusing to marry him and 
c4J /d. 
, •• Assuming that Jane bel ieves that Rochester i s  st i l l  married , her return to h im would 
entail a c iv i l  impediment on ly  if  they committed adultery, someth ing which she i s  not 
conte mplat ing at the t ime she receives th is  s ign . 
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ultimately l eaving h im in  response to a s ign from heaven through 
nature proves that she knows better than he what (her) God 
demands . S he can speak direct ly to heaven and heaven to her. 
Jane ' s  n arration makes c lear that she believes ,  though skeptics 
and atheists may not have ,  that the Divine had worked through 
nature to reveal i ts , thei r, law. Jane hears Rochester' s voice .  
Rochester later te l ls  Jane that he  i n  fact spoke her  name at 
precisely the time she believes she heard it cross  the miles .  
Because nature does i ts  best  at her request , Jane instinctively 
realizes that s he can return to Rochester unopposed by law and 
morality.  Rochester' s  voice is the "free and clear" signal . The 
danger has passed . In her understanding, every aspect of l aw i s  
uniform in  i t s  permiss ion ,  jus t  a s  each had once been , also in  her 
understanding, uniform in  its prohibition . 
E. Domesticity as Bliss : Ferndean Manor 
Jane discovers that B ertha has burned Thornfield  to the ground 
and leapt to her death . Rochester, who subsequently moved to 
his manor house at Ferndean , lost  an eye and a hand trying to 
prevent B ertha' s suicide . His  fai lure to save Bertha makes i t  
possible for h im and Jane to marry, which they do after he 
overcomes self-doubts about his  worthines s .  
Jane believes her  s tory has a happy ending. If the ending of 
Jane Eyre is happy, it i s  not because Jane becomes e specially 
free or Rochester is especial ly punished . Nothing in the novel 
suggests t hat Jane uses her financial independence and education 
to obtain the e xpanded social l ife and travel she once c laimed 
she wanted and was denied on account of gender. Jane ' s  concerns 
about enslavement disappear, though she i s  s t i l l  a female confined 
by her society to c hiefly domestic roles .  For better or for worse , 
Jane ' s  happiness comes to her through traditional caretaker 
roles .  245 A lthough feminists  of her generation argued that married 
245 B ronte was never able "consciously to define the full  meaning of achieved freedom­
perhaps because no one of her  contemporaries ,  not even a Wollstonecraft or a Mi l l , could 
adequately describe a society so drastically altered that the matured Jane and Rochester 
could reall y  live i n  i t . "  G I LB E RT & G U BAR,  supra note 36,  at 369-70 . Cf. M A RY Wou­
STONECRAFT, A V I NDICATION OF THE R IGHTS OF WOMAN (Carol H .  Poston ed . ,  W. W. 
Norton ,  2d ed. 1 988) ( 1 792) ( decry i ng the education of women which emphasized feminine 
beauty, rather than talent or virtue,  rendering women weak , frivolous,  and inferior) .  
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women were de facto "slave s , "  Jane does not feel  l ike a slave in 
the end.  
Jane finds happiness in  the tranquility of mind that can come 
from being loved by one ' s  husband .  For Jane , "legal " love is 
enough .  After her marriage i t  appears that neither her relationship 
with Rochester nor anything else in  her life raises doubts about 
the unity of nomic order. Jane embraces domesticity as an act of 
moral autonomy. She is  exactly as constrained by law as she 
wants to be . Jane complains  no more about her lot in  life even 
though , from the point of view of the positive law, her lot i s  
Gateshead revisited . 
Bronte scholars are fond of saying that Rochester i s  punished 
for his promiscuity,  adultery, and attempted bigamy. 246 He is  
bl inded . He loses  a hand . Thornfield i s  destroyed by fire . How­
ever, Rochester i s  not punished by the positive law. The positive 
Engl ish authorit ies regard his wrongs as either private moral 
wrongs , or wrongs of public import that occurred in foreign j u­
risdictions .  Rochester i s  punished only by personal tragedy and 
mi sfortune . John A ustin suggests two ways to think of personal 
tragedies as "legal" sanctions .  They can be viewed as religious 
sanctions ( properly so-called) stemming from breaches in the 
divine law or as natural sanctions (metaphorically so-called) with­
out the intervention of any law other than the metaphorical law 
of phys ical forces .  247 
Thus , bl indness can be viewed as a d ivine sanction for Roch­
ester' s breach of d iv ine law in his attempted bigamy and adultery ; 
the loss of his  home i s  a natural sanction stemming from his 
fai lure to properly constrain Bertha. Austi n ' s  own examples fit 
the circumstances of 1 ane Eyre perfectl y :  
I f  a man were smitten with bl indness b y  the immediate 
appointment of the  Deity,  and in  consequence of a sin he  
had committed against  the  divine law, he  would suffer a 
religious sanction through h i s  physical or bodily organs .  
. . . I f  your house be destroyed by fire through your 
neglect[] . . . , you bring upon yourse lf, by your negligent  
omiss ion,  a physical or natural sanction : supposing, I mean , 
��6 See, e.g., MOGLEN, supra note 3 ,  at 1 4 1 . 
��7 I AUSTIN , supra note 1 0 ,  at 2 1 2 . 
I 
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that your destruction of your house i s  not to be deemed a 
punishment inflicted by the hand of the Deity. 248 
Rochester suffers losses ,  but i t  i s  easy to overstate their sig­
nificance . He loses Thornfield , but  he has Ferndean . He has 
money, including h i s  inheritance from his  father and elder 
brother. And he has money acquired through his union with 
Bertha. When he marries Jane ,  he acquires control over her 
money too . Rochester loses Bertha,  but he does not want her. 
Jane i s  the wife he wants , and Jane he has . Rochester loses h i s  
vi sion , but  gains  some back in  t ime to  enjoy the  faces of  h i s  
children . He loses a hand but  acquires  a doting handmaiden ,  Jane 
Eyre . 
V I .  CONCLUSION 
Jane ' s  eyre i s  a journey from the rebel l ion of a passionate , 
precocious youth , to the self-discipl ined, calculated conformity 
of young adulthood . Jane comes to believe that i t  is  right and 
prudent to adhere to the "rules  and principles" commanded by 
God , by c iv i l  society ' s  posit ive law, by  conventional morality, 
and by nature . S he also comes to believe that her own powers 
of reason and observation are equal to or more adequate than 
those of her soc ial superiors . A proper judge , she is ful ly  equal 
to the task of apprehending the "rules and principles" of obliga­
tion that b ind her. 
Jane ' s  journey i s  undertaken without the natural endowments 
of most heroines of the nineteenth-century novel . Unl ike Jane 
Austen ' s  Emma,249 for e xample ,  Bronte ' s  Jane i s  neither hand­
some , rich ,  nor especial l y  c lever. She is  the social and physical 
inferior of those with whom she must do battle about the funda­
mental terms and conditions of her ex istence . Jane ' s  significant 
endowment is her morall y  autonomous character. It assures  that 
she is successfu l  at keeping both her social superiors and her 
own passionate , rebe l l ious impulses  at bay. 
"4H fd. 
"49 JANE AusTE N ,  E M M A  ( London.  John M u rray 1 8 1 6 ) .  
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Our society can be viewed as entrusting to a corp of social 
elites the right to set and/or interpret its norms , its " law s . "  These 
el ites judge what the rules are and what they require . It i s  sup­
posed that God ' s  commands may be known through the clergy ; 
the sovereign ' s  through lawyers and judge s ;  moral i ty ' s  through 
aristocrats and other social ly  prominent persons ; nature ' s  
through scient ists . Accordingly ,  Americans look t o  psychologists 
to tell us whether, for exampl e ,  homosexuality i s  against  the 
" law" of nature and to the court s  to te l l  whether i t  i s  a "crime" 
against the law of the sovereign people .  Our clergy pronounce 
whether homosexuality is ungodly ,  the sociall y  prominent 
whether it i s  social l y  acceptable . 
Jane ' s  resistance to the authority of social el i tes entrusted by 
Engl ish society to  interpret nomic reality initial ly  results  i n  dis­
approval , i sol ation,  and punishment . For example , she endures 
psychological torment in  the hands of the self-deceived St .  Joh n ,  
who bel ieves he speaks for God and believes that Jane i s  by  
nature free of  the passions he h imself seeks to  repre s s .  Jane i s  
punished by Mrs . Reed and disparaged by the  haughty B lanche 
Ingram, social elites who purport to speak for social moral i ty .  
B ut Reed ' s  se lfishness and I ngram' s  vanity bl ind them to the true 
requirements of customary morality, whose highest ideal s are 
exemplified by B ess ie , Miss Temple , and the Rivers si sters , self­
possessed working women . 
Jane ' s  resolve to resist  i s  chal lenged from within as well  as 
without . Her appreciation of human fal l ibi l ity, her keen desire to 
do what i s  right ,  and her  wish to give others their due , make her 
skeptical of her own powers of reason and observation . However, 
Jane eventuall y  learns that, despite poverty and female gender, 
she can find a degree of freedom through education , self-disci­
pl ine , and wage labor. She also learns that by  holding her ground , 
by trusting her  own rational judgment and perceptions ,  she can 
find the only kinds of friendship ,  family,  affluence, and love worth 
having : those that are orderly and self-constructed . 
Jane ' s  l ife poses a phi losophical question : I s  there unity of 
law ? That i s ,  i s  what God , positive law, positive morality, and 
nature demand of us the same ? Is what i s  right and just  in  one 
normative sphere precise ly what i s  right and just  in  al l  the others ? 
Jane ' s  l ife responds with the same answer Austi n ' s  phi losophy 
gives :  v irtuall y  yes.  Assuming unclouded cognition and strong 
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characters , individual s can rely  upon their own reason and senses 
to apprehend law and its  unity. 
Like much post-Hobbesian modern B rit ish legal positivism , 
Jane Eyre attributes the  appearance of normative disunity to 
moral and epis temological defects . The Reeds , Brocklehurst , 
Lowood inmate Helen B urns ,  Rochester, mad B ertha, and St .  
John suffer l imi tations of  character and cognition that lead all of 
them to misconceive the ir own duties and ,  some of them, to 
misconceive Jane ' s .  Like the philosophers'  texts , Jane ' s  narra­
tion of her s tory presupposes that civi l  law and divine or moral 
law are distinct ; but  it i mplores adherence to the rules of civil  
law. The morality that leads Jane to this conclusion i s ,  I suggest ,  
a self-interested ,  generically uti li tarian C hristian morality.  
Jane ' s  journey ends when she overcomes any tendency to 
believe that social el i tes are better able than she to judge the 
meaning and requirements of law. The discipl ine of a basic edu­
cation and good character make ordinary men and women as 
deserving and able as the wealthy, the aristocrat ic ,  and members 
of the learned professions to judge human obligation .  One detects 
an anti-posit ivism in Jane ' s  democratic ideal : in the name of 
genuine natural law we should turn our backs to social superiors 
who expect obedience to their perverted positive "law. " This 
emphasis i s  the streak of egalitarian individual i sm and "original­
ity" in Jane ' s  thought that shocked some of Bronte ' s  
contemporaries .  
Yet ,  s o  far a s  the jurisprudence of the novel goe s ,  only the fact 
that the novel ' s  heroine began as a poor female could make this 
familiar phi losophy radical . 250 Jane ' s  s tory i s  rendered orthodox 
by her ult imate commitment to "rules and principle s , "  to a l ife 
that i s  "en regie , ' '  to formal education ,  religion ,  work , marriage , 
and family responsibi l i ty .  This orthodoxy i s  qualified by the im­
perative of female autonomy. However, much of the furor the 
novel provoked among B ronte ' s  contemporaries was centered on 
its frank depiction of Rochester ' s  sexual promiscuity and his 
attempt to corrupt h i s  young governess  through bigamy and adul-
250 See generally THOMAS , supra note 56,  at 7 ("story about the conflict between the 
individual ' s  need for freedom and society ' s  need for order provided t hrough rul e  b y  law" 
is "as old as l i terature i tself") .  But see G ILBERT & GuBAR, supra note 36, at 338 ( I t  is 
not Rochester's byronic sexual energy but rather Jane ' s  "anger," the work ' s  "rebell ious 
femin ism." that "horrified the V ictorians . " ) .  
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tery. 25 1 If Jane Eyre can be reduced to a central message , it is  
the imperative of autonomous judgment . Al l  persons ,  even the 
frail , the poor, the o rdinary, and the female ,  must , and therefore 
must be free to , ascertain and reconcile themselves to the re­
quirements of the practical "rules and principles"  of normative 
order. Sti ll ,  the novel  offered nineteenth-century patriarch y  a 
kind of reassurance M ary Wollstonecraft ' s ,  John Stuart Mi l l ' s ,  
and Harriet  Taylor ' s  feminist writings did not : 252 that the l ibera­
tion of white , female property owners would make no difference 
to the fundamental structure of male-dominated society . Women 
would choose to use their freedom and wealth to sustain business 
as usual . 
25 1 CHARLOTTE B RONTE,  supra note 2, at 3 3 .  
252 See generally WoLLSTONECRAFT, supra note 245 ; JOHN STUART MILL ,  THE S u B­
JECTION OF WOMEN ( 1 869) ; H A RRIET TAYLOR MILL ,  ENFRANCH ISEMENT OF WOMEN 
( 1 85 1  ) .  
